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    Freedom of movement is hailed as an accomplishment of the European Union, but it also 
hinders EU member states that experience significantly higher levels of emigration than 
immigration.  While the European Union likes to believe that EU citizens can move to any 
member state, this is difficult without the necessary language skills to work and live in another 
European nation.  An important question is how do language skills as opposed to economic 
deterrents impact EU migration to Southern and Eastern European member states?  Part of the 
issue is that the European Union has twenty-four official languages, and citizens may choose to 
study only a couple of these languages to learn as it is unrealistic to learn every official language.    
English, German, and French are the top three spoken languages in the EU, along with being the 
three most studied foreign languages.  These are also the official working languages in European 
Union Institutions.  These languages also appear to be preferred due to the higher level of 
economic development of Northern EU member states.   
     I have chosen Italy and Romania as case studies for this thesis.  These two countries have the 
lowest percentage of college graduates in the EU and would benefit if these two member states 
were able to attract more highly educated EU migrants.  With these countries I hope to examine 
why these two member states are often overlooked by EU citizens looking for another member 
state to live and work in.  I also felt it is important to look at a country from Eastern Europe and 
a country from Southern Europe to look at the similarities and differences in the challenges these 
member states face.  Despite Italy’s and Romania’s large populations, Italian and Romanian are 
not popular foreign languages for citizens of other member states to study.  The citizens of 
Romania and Italy are also less likely to know English as well as citizens in other member states.  
This makes it difficult to attract migrants from other EU member states.  In addition, these 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review 
     One of the most cherished benefits for citizens of European Union member states is the 
freedom of movement, one of the four freedoms of the European Single Market.  The four 
freedoms are: free movement of people, goods, services, and capital1.  This thesis will focus 
on the free movement of people.  The European Single Market and its four freedoms are 
massive achievements in recent European history. The free movement of labor via the Schengen 
Agreement is particularly notable, in that it allows the citizens of EU member states to freely 
move about the union. However, intra-EU migration has not been even among the member 
states, with some benefitting from emigration and immigration more than others.  It is not easy to 
understand why some member states are chosen over others by intra-EU migrants.  While many 
Northern and Southern member states have been successful in attracting migrants from the other 
Southern and Eastern member states of the European Union, this migration has remained uni-
directional.  This is why it is important to study why other Southern and Eastern member states 
have not had the same success in attracting migrants.  In order to do this, I chose Italy and 
Romania.  Italy and Romania are larger member states in Southern and Eastern Europe but are 
the two countries with the lowest college completion rate in the European Union (see table 1.1), 
arguably giving them more of a reason to try to compete for migrants from other member states.  
In addition, Italy has the lowest fertility rate in the European Union2, and both Italy and Romania 
have lost a large amount of their own citizens in emigration to larger member states3.  In order to 
balance this loss, both countries would likely attempt to attract migrants from other European 
Union member states.  Both member states have struggled and have not been able to balance the 
 
1 Information about the four freedoms can be found at the European Union.  <https://europa.eu/european-
union/topics/single-market_en> 
2 Data can be found at the European Commission. <Fertility statistics - Statistics Explained (europa.eu)> 




emigration with immigration.  It is important to analyze whether the reasons for this are solely 
economic, or if the foreign language knowledge of Italians and Romanians have played a role in 
the lack of migrants as well.    
Table 1.1: Tertiary Education Attainment in EU Member States, 30-34 Age Group4 
Member State Percent of citizens aged 30-34 years old  





























    
     Thus, the main research question that will shape the arguments and research of this thesis is 
this: how do language skills, as opposed to economic deterrents impact intra-European Union 
 




migration to Southern and Eastern member states?  While the strength of a national economy is 
important in order to attract migrants, there can be other factors that can impact migration as 
well, particularly language skills.  The European Union has twenty-four official languages, along 
with a large number of dialects and minority languages spoken as well5.  As it cannot be 
expected that European Union citizens learn all twenty-four official languages, the language 
skills they do possess have the potential to influence EU citizens on the member states to which 
they might migrate.  Knowing a language that is widely spoken in a member state can help a 
European Union citizen integrate into the member state where they chose to work.  The 
European Union itself has acknowledged the impact that language skills can have on the mobility 
of European Union citizens.6  It was also included in a 2008 European Council resolution as one 
of the major points, which urged the European Commission and member states of the European 
Union to “Better promote multilingualism as a factor in the European economy's competitiveness 
and people's mobility and employability” (Youth and Culture Council, 2008). 
     As the population of member states continue to age and the working-age population continues 
to shrink, intra-European Union migration is an important potential source of labor. Besides 
attracting migrants simply for labor, member states can try to attract highly educated migrants 
that member states can use to fill in gaps in their national labor market.  Nations in the European 
Union can benefit from the freedom of movement of persons and rely on intra-EU migration to 
fill labor shortages, instead of migration from outside the bloc.  
     The Treaty of Rome defines the competencies that the European Union controls, 
competencies the EU shares with member states, and finally competencies that only the member 
 
5 A list of EU official languages can be found on the European Union website. < https://europa.eu/european-
union/about-eu/eu-languages_en> 




states control.  Title I states that exclusive areas of legislation the European Union control which 
include: the single market, the customs union, and the monetary policy of member states that use 
the euro.  Title I of the Treaty of Rome also clarifies that in competencies that the European 
Union shares with member states, the member states are given legislative control over the part of 
the competence that the European Union has not specified itself (European Union, 1957a).  Title 
IV of the treaty defines migration as a competence shared by the European Union and the 
member states.  The European Union expects the member states to respect third-country 
nationals, but shares the competency to allow member states to codify the fair treatment of third-
country nationals in their different legal systems (European Union, 1957b).  Protocol 19 details 
the Schengen Area which permits the free movement of persons without border controls at 
national borders within the area (European Union, 2012).   
     My Thesis will be divided into several chapters.  In Chapter 2, migration will be studied at the 
supranational level.  Reports from the European Union about intra-European Union migration 
will be analyzed to look at the existing patterns in the European Union and to see how migration 
has changed over time in the European Union since the creation of the freedom of movement, 
and continues to change looking into the future.  The rights of European Union citizens have 
been restricted overtime in order to protect the welfare systems of richer member states 
(Barbulescu and Favell, 2020), so it is important to see the impact this has had on intra-European 
Union migration.        
     Legislation from the European Union will be analyzed in the beginning chapter about the 
freedom of movement.  It is important to examine how the way freedom of movement was 
written into law has influenced migration within the European Union.  While it may seem simple 
at a first glance, various rules associated with the freedom of movement have had an impact on 
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intra-European Union migration.  In order to appease older member states of the European 
Union, a transition period was permitted for these member states to restrict migration from 
member states directly after acceding (Koikkalainen, 2020).  Not all details of freedom of 
movement have been legislated by the European Union, and various aspects have been left for 
the individual member states to decide these aspects.  This means it can be easier or harder for a 
European Union citizen depending on both the rules legislated by the European Union and those 
that each individual member state has independently created.   
     In the Chapter 3, the economic strengths and weaknesses of Italy and Romania will be 
examined.  This is in order to try to explain why Italy and Romania have not had as much 
success attracting intra-European Union migrants from other member states, as other member 
states in the European Union have been able to do.  The economic characteristics that will be 
examined of the Italian and Romanian economies include GDP per capita, the unemployment 
rate, wages and how they compare with the European Union average.  Italy’s and Romania’s 
economies will also be compared to nearby member states.  If Italy and Romania have weaker 
economies than nearby member states, this can be a strong reason for intra-European Union 
migrants choosing to migrate to other member states instead of Italy or Romania. 
     Chapter 3 will additionally look at how Italy and Romania may have issues regarding the 
regulation of migration and protecting worker rights.  If these two member states have a high 
burden on intra-European Union migrants, this can serve as a deterrent.  If the economies of Italy 
and Romania are not well regulated, this increases opportunities for workers to be abused in 
these two member states.  If Italy and Romania do not have well-regulated economies, potential 
causes of this will be discussed as well.   
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      Chapter 4 will look at the language knowledge of Italy and Romania.  If these two member 
states do not have a strong understanding of English or other widely spoken European languages, 
it would be hard for intra-European Union migrants to work there even if economic incentives 
exist to work in these member states.  The history of Italian language standardization may help 
explain why Italy has been potentially slower to prioritize foreign language skills when 
compared to other EU member states.  This chapter will also discuss how Italy’s current foreign 
language policies in schools and Italy’s strategy is to spread foreign language knowledge within 
the country still have not seen the same level of foreign language knowledge among Italian 
students as students in other EU nations.   
     The conclusion answers my original research question and summarizes my findings on how 
the economic performance and linguistic capabilities of Italy and Romania have impacted their 
ability to attract intra-EU migrants.  The conclusion also includes possibilities of continuing to 
research intra-EU migration.  This last part of the thesis also explains what these findings mean 
for the European Union as a whole.         
Literature Review       
     This section reviews literature concerning the economies and language policies of Romania 
and Italy in an effort to contextualize data that reveals what separates Romania and Italy from 
other EU member states in matters of internal EU migration.  It looks to examine the structure 
and weakness of the Italian and Romanian economies, yet also uncovers some interesting 
features they have.  It examines the language policies these countries have had to date, and 
whether these policies encourage or discourage emigration of EU citizens to Italy or Romania.  
This review also examines how similarities between the Romanian and Italian languages have 
motivated Romanian migration to Italy.  This well help to establish why these countries face 
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more difficulties than other nations in attracting EU migrants, but also explain why Italy has 
been able to attract the most Romanian immigrants of any member state in the European Union.             
     Roxana Barbulescu and Adrian Favell have argued that the freedom of movement has 
actually not worked as initially intended (Barbulescu and Favell, 2020).  While originally 
viewed as an achievement for the European Union, freedom of movement has been viewed with 
scorn by Western member states following the Eastern Enlargement starting in 2004.  The 
freedom of movement of persons was seen as a burden and threat for member states with 
generous welfare systems.  Instead of working to prevent fraud, benefits were curtailed in favor 
of national citizens instead of equal treatment of European Union citizens as previously intended.  
While European Union institutions were expected to defend the freedom of movement, they 
appear to be in favor of supporting national welfare systems and security concerns, rather than 
defend the right of European Union citizens living in different nations than the one that they have 
national citizenship from.  This was made possible by giving permission to old member states to 
initially restrict the migration of citizens from new member states. 
     Sofia Vasilopoulou and Lisa Talving discuss how national attitudes toward freedom of 
movement are different based on the relative wealth of a particular member state (Vasilopoulou 
and Talving, 2019).  More affluent member states have divided public opinions about freedom of 
movement.  The opinion towards freedom of movement in affluent nations relies on the level of 
education of the individual.  More educated respondents are likely to be supportive, while those 
who are less educated and have a stronger national identity are more likely to view freedom of 
movement as a threat.  In poorer member states in the European Union, support for freedom of 
movement remains very high.  Vasilopoulou and Talving show that the GDP per capita of a 
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member state is proven to be the strongest determinant on the public opinion in the member state 
towards freedom of movement. 
     According to Jon Kvist, negative opinions towards freedom of movement is nothing new in 
the European Union (Kvist, 2004).  This existed before ten additional countries became member 
states of the European Union in 2004.  Western member states were already fearful of a large 
wave of migration from these new poorer Eastern European member states.  In order to prevent 
this large wave of migration, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain all negotiated to temporarily restrict the 
freedom of movement of citizens of the member states that acceded in 2004.  This was done 
based on the presumption that there would be wide-scale migration to Western European Union 
member states solely because of their welfare systems.  The member states that chose not to 
restrict migration from the countries that acceded the European Union in 2004, instead chose to 
make changes to their social policies in order to protect their welfare system from potential new 
arrivals.  These restrictions were an important factor shaping migration patterns in 2004 as 
migrants had limited options. 
     Alessandro Pellegata and Francesco Visconti (2020) explore how opposition to migrants’ 
entitlement to welfare benefits has grown in Italy, similar to other member states.  Many Italian 
citizens, and many from other EU member states for that matter, view immigrants as outsiders.  
Recent increases in Euroscepticism across member states have exacerbated this issue.  This 
sentiment was a driving factor in the 2018 election in Italy, which saw the success of Eurosceptic 
political parties who have anti-migration stances.  On the other hand, there is strong support for 
economic assistance for only Italians in the country.  In Italy, like in other member states, drastic 
changes in the European Union have resulted in winners and losers the further member states 
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continue to integrate and lose national sovereignty.  Winners are those who are able to succeed 
with more integration, while losers, who see integration as competition will consider nation-
states vital to protecting their socio-economic status.  People who view the nation-state as vital 
also view welfare as something to be restricted to only those who belong to the nation-state, 
which can be seen in Italy (Pellegata and Visconti, 2020).           
     Italy’s economy is divided in two.  Emanuele Felice (2019) discusses how since the 
completion of the reunification process in 1871, the north generally has been better off 
economically than southern Italy.  There has been limited economic convergence between the 
northern and southern regions, but still, the north has been doing significantly better than the 
south.  Northern Italian regions have significantly higher GDP per capita (see Table 1.2), along 
with higher industrial production (see Table 1.3).  In recent years, the divergence between the 
Southern and Northern economies in Italy has widened.  Around unification, the southern 
regions of Sicily and Campania each had a GDP per capita around the Italian median GDP per 
capita.  Shortly after reunification, this can be explained by the fact that Italy’s economy had yet 
to modernize.  When it did, modernization mainly happened in Northern Italy while Southern 
Italy was left behind.  While Northern Italy’s economy industrialized, Southern Italy remained 
heavily reliant on the agricultural sector.  It is much more challenging to pinpoint why Southern 
Italy has fallen behind once again in the past five decades, after a period of convergence.  What 
is clear is that geography is not to blame for Southern Italy’s economic troubles.  Felice argues 
that Campania is Italy’s Southern region with the best geographic position due to its proximity to 
Rome, and yet it is the worse off economically. 
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Table 1.2: GDP per capita in Italian Regions7 
Region of Italy GDP per capita (in thousands of euros) 
Northern Regions 
Provincia Autonoma Bolzano 48,100 
Lombardia  39,700 
Provincia Autonoma Trento 38,800 
Valle d’Aosta 38,800 



















Table 1.3: GDP contribution per worker in Industry compared to Italy (100)8.   
Region of Italy GDP Per Worker in Industry  
Northern Regions 
Lombardia 115 








7 This data can be found at ISTAT. <https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/251960>  
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     It is crucial to look at why Romanians migrated to Italy, as they are Italy’s largest migrant 
population (see table 1.4) and greatly outnumber immigrants from any other European Union 
member state that reside in Italy.  Cornel Ban explains that cooperation between the Italian and 
Romanian governments helped motivate Romanian migration to Italy (Ban, 2012).  Romanians 
initially immigrated to Italy due to agreements between the two national governments shortly 
after the collapse of the socialist government in 1989.  The lack of jobs in Romania encouraged 
Romanians to look for work in other countries even before the Romanian accession to the 
European Union.  Romanians were already the largest group of foreign workers in Italy has 
before Romania became a member of the European Union in 2007.  Migrants during this period 
were predominantly from Moldavia in Eastern Romania, along with several regions in the 
Northwestern portion of the country.  Ban looks at how many Romanian migrants tended to 
migrate to the same areas in Italy, often seeing towns losing a majority of their population except 
during summer and winter holidays.  In one extreme case, the town of Borsa had half of its 
population of 30,000 living in Milan.  Before Romania became a member state, 64 percent of 
Romanians were work tourists, and worked in Italy for 3-9 months per year.  Italy became a top 
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destination country due the ease with which Romanians could obtain forged documents to travel 
to and work in Italy.   
Table 1.4: Number of Citizens from Each Member State Living in Italy9 
European Union Member State Number of Citizens Living in Italy 





United Kingdom 29.654 
Spain 25,954 
Croatia 16,285 




















        Another explanation for Romanian migrants continuing to choose Italy that Cornel Ban 
brings up is the fact that Italy’s national government did not seem as concerned with stopping 
illegal immigration as other western countries were, particularly Germany (Ban, 2012).    
 




Germany implemented regulations in the 1990s in an effort to put an end to illegal immigration.  
Even while Italy made several efforts to reform illegal immigration, rather than kicking 
Romanians out, the government allowed to stay within Italy (Uccellini, 2009).  Romanians in 
Italy also found informal ways to send remittances to family members in Romania without the 
usage of banks or credit Unions through Italy’s informal economy.  Romanians could pay bus 
security a fee to bring cash back to Romania for their families.  Romanians illegally working in 
Italy could not only send home money and avoid a record of their money transfers, they also got 
a cheaper rate sending remittances through the coach companies than banks and credit unions. 
     Despite negative press media concerning Eastern European immigrants in other member 
states, Romanians still came to Italy.  This is partly due to Italian officials doing their best to 
make it clear Romanians were welcome to migrate to Italy.  Italian Prime Minister Brodi stated 
that Romanians and Italians were brothers, and were bonded together through language, history, 
and friendship.  Part of this was motivated by Italy’s economic interests in Romania, where 
thousands of Italian firms conducted business could face potential economic fallout if Italians did 
not accept Romanians as legal migrants (Uccellini, 2009).  What is clear, is that despite being 
viewed as outsiders, Italy still remained the number one country for Romanian migrants within 
the European Union.          
     Gabriela Nicolescu (2019) discusses how one of the main jobs for Romanians living in Italy is 
working as a badante, or care giver for the elderly.  This work is available throughout the 
country, even in the poorer south partially because the National Social Security Institute helps 
pay for in-home care.  Poorer families can receive 900 euros a month in order to take care of 
elderly family members.  Italian families were not necessarily looking for a registered nurse, as 
evident by the majority having no previous health care experience.  Italian families were simply 
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looking for care workers to look after elderly family members who needed it.  Nursing homes are 
not very popular in Italy, and badanti (cheap health care workers) who live in the home and care 
for the family members is seen as a more acceptable solution.  These Romanian migrants, mainly 
women, could still earn enough as badanti to send money home to family members in Romania. 
     While briefly described by Nicolescu (2019), when discussing how badanti do not have 
official contracts, Leila Talani (2019) specifically addresses how in Italy the informal economy 
is a major driver of migration.  This includes migrants from not European Union member states 
and helps explains Italy’s large population of migrants from non-European Union and non-
European countries.  It also further explains why primarily Romanians, Bulgarians, and Polish 
migrants have come to Italy to search for work as well.  Talani clarifies that by no means 
migrants are culpable for Italy’s informal economy, rather that they are taking advantage of 
employment opportunities that are available to them from the informal economy.  These 
employment opportunities have resulted in large-scale migration to Italy, despite the difficulties 
of trying to obtain a regular migration status after arrival.  While some experts thought the 
number of people working irregular jobs would decrease, the situation appears to be worsening 
over time.  Talani also points out that while some estimates of the size of the informal economy 
in Italy show a decrease, this is not the case.  Many of these estimates leave out illegal activities 
which in turn make the informal economy appear smaller than it truly is.  Businesses in Italy may 
not register officially as a business in order to avoid paying taxes and social security obligations, 
or because they are engaged in illegal activities, which prevents them from legally registering as 
a business due to the activities they are involved in.  Registered businesses will also misreport 
how much they produced in order to pay less taxes and social security obligations.  Even 
registered workers and businesses may be left out from the official size of Italy’s economy due to 
being misclassified based on size of business, wrong geographic code, or because the business 
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was put in the wrong category regarding its industry.  Another source is statisticians making 
statistical errors when calculating the volume and value of products from registered businesses.   
     Reasons why Romanians continue to stay in Italy are discussed by Andrica Nicoleta (2020).  
Earlier academic literature suggests that many Romanians had the intention to return home, but 
Nicoleta discusses why the number of Romanians has continued to grow, and why many 
Romanians are choosing to remain in Italy long-term.  Italy remains more economically 
developed economy than Romania, and all twenty regions of Italy have attracted Romanian 
migrants; however, most continue to live in Central or Northern Italy.  Romanian men continue 
to work primarily in construction and agriculture, meanwhile Romanian women work primarily 
in various service industries and as elderly care workers.  Regardless of the sector, Romanian 
migrants in Italy continue to earn more than Romanians who live and work in Romania.  
Romanian migrants continue to be primarily Romanian women; in 2010 there were 77,000 more 
Romanian women than men compared to 2019 when there were 180,000 more Romanian women 
than men.  Romanians are primarily employees in Italy, but 7,000 companies are owned and 
operated by Romanian migrants.  Romanians continue to choose to work in Italy primarily for 
economic reasons, as they are able to earn money to send home to family members in Romania.  
In 2018, 730 million euros were sent to Romania from Italy.  Nicoleta also pointed out how 
Romanians who live and work in Italy can now benefit from Quota 100, a program launched by 
the Italian national government in 2019.  Under Quota 100, European citizens working in Italy 
and contributing to the pension fund have the right to collect pension benefits.  
     Paul Bridgen and Traute Meyer examine how intra-European Union migrants are impacted 
financially if they choose to retire in the member state where they moved to work (Bridgen and 
Meyer, 2017).  Italy does not have relatively high wage rates among EU member states that have 
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attracted Romanian migrants. Even though this is the case, Romanian workers have an easier 
time living above the poverty line following their retirement. The same holds true for Spain, but 
does not in Germany and the UK.  While Romanians live above the poverty line in Italy and 
Spain after retirement, they are at greater risk of living below the poverty line in Germany and 
the United Kingdom.  Part of this is because pensions benefits transfer from their home country 
to the country they migrated to, and the pension they earned in their home country is often not 
adequate to help support European Union intra-migrants in retirement in their destination 
country.   While migrants from poorer member states may benefit from higher wages in 
Germany or the United Kingdom initially, they will struggle in retirement due to their pensions 
not measuring up to the standards set for German citizens.  This is a result of the total of their 
pension benefits that the migrants earned in their home member state along with the pension 
benefits they earned in their destination country are lower than the poverty line in the destination 
country.  Besides cost of living, another factor is the generosity of the pension systems of the 
various member states.  The Spanish system has the most generous pension system meanwhile 
Italy has the second most generous system.  The United Kingdom and Germany are less 
generous, and Germany is the least generous of the four countries.  This makes it harder for 
European Union migrants from member states with lower wages to live above the poverty line 
with their wages.  It is notable that German retirees themselves struggle to live above the poverty 
line.  The German system is not only fiscally conservative with migrants, but German nationals 
as well.  For migrants from significantly poorer member states, earlier migration is vital for them 
to receive higher pensions if they then choose to retire in their destination country.  In order for 
future migrants to enjoy higher pensions in their destination countries, there will need to be more 
convergence of wages among the member states for this to occur. 
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     Economic growth is crucial for Romania’s economic convergence with other European Union 
member states yet as Pavel and Moldovan (2019) point out, economic growth amongst 
Romania’s regions is not equal.  Partly this is due to the fact that Romania is one of the most 
rural member states.  As of 2017, 43.6 percent of Romanians lived in rural areas of the country.  
Rural areas also tended to have poorer quality of infrastructure.  In 2011, only seven percent of 
rural roads were modernized, and only 28.2 percent of Romanian communes had sewage 
networks and water purification systems.  While the quality of infrastructure did not impact local 
economic growth in rural areas of Romania in the short term, other factors do.  In order for 
Romanian regions to see local economic development, Romanian communes need to be close to 
a large urban area and have direct access to the E-road network of the European Union.     
    Simona Bodogai and Stephen Cutler (2014) argue that because Romania has an aging 
population, this will have a significant financial impact on the country.  It is expected that older 
Romanians will make up 30 percent of the population by 2050.  Projections vary, but the 
minimum expected value is 30.9 percent estimated by Eurostat.    This will be more than slightly 
double than Romania’s older population in 2010, which was only 14.9 percent and lower than 
the European Union’s average of 17.1 percent.  As it is, due to the poorer economic performance 
of Romania compared to other countries, it will be more difficult to support a much larger 
portion of the population.  The older population is much more pronounced in rural Romania, 
where 55.6 percent of Romanians older than 65 live, compared to 44 percent of Romania’s 
overall population in 2012.  The main factors causing Romania’s population to rapidly age 
include a lower fertility rate, external migration to other European Union member states and 
other countries, and a higher life expectancy for Romanians.  Besides a lower fertility rate 
causing an aging population, another contributor is the baby boom that occurred in Romania in 
the 1960s through 1980s.  President Nicolae Ceauşescu banned abortions in 1966 which caused a 
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rapid increase in the birth rate and this generation was known as the decree babies generation.  
Romanians had relied almost exclusively on abortions as their primary means for family 
planning which led to a large increase in children being born when this was no longer an option.  
In 1989 abortion was made legal again after the overthrow of Ceauşescu which led to a decrease 
in the birthrate once again.  The median age of Romania’s population was 38.3 in 2010 up from 
34.4 in 2000 and is projected to reach 51.4 by 2050.  
     Anca Dachin discusses how part of Romania’s economic problems is partly due to the large 
role agriculture still plays in the economy (Dachin, 2011).  Agriculture remains vulnerable due to 
variables that are hard to control, in particular changes in climate and the price of energy.  Due to 
these uncontrollable variables and the large portion that agriculture makes up of Romania’s 
economy, this causes significant fluctuations in Romania’s Gross Domestic Product, prices, and 
the employment rate.  Romania has continued to see significantly higher employment in the 
agriculture sector compared to the European Union and other member states of the European 
Union in Eastern Europe (see table 1.5).   
Table 1.5: Percent of Workers Employed in the Agricultural Sectors of EU Member States.10 
EU Member State Percentage of Workers Employed in the 
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United Kingdom 1.1 
Luxembourg 0.8 
 
     After having reviewed the literature on the economic aspects of migration, let me turn to how 
scholars evaluate the role of language.  When it comes to Romania and Italy, an important issue 
when it comes to attracting intra-EU migrants is language.  As neither Romanian nor Italian is 
widely studied in the European Union, it is important that these two member states can speak a 
widely spoken language.  The most spoken language in the European Union is English which is 
why the capability of Italians and Romanians ability to speak English will be examined in depth.   
       Before it is possible to understand why Italians have not learned English as well as member 
states in the European Union, it is important to examine the history of language in Italy.  As 
Jillian Cavanaugh (2008) demonstrates, this history can help explain why foreign language 
instruction has not been prioritized in Italy, in comparison to the other large member states such 
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as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (Cavanaugh, 2008).  This article adds important 
information on how politics in Italy have impacted the importance of standardization of the 
Italian dialects and then the revival of dialects.  Before Italy could focus on teaching foreign 
languages, it had to deal with the issue of standardizing the Italian language itself.  During 
Fascism, Mussolini sought to end the usage of dialects and replace it with standard Italian.  
While the Northern League has changed their original stance of Northern Italian regions 
breaking off from Italy and forming their own country, they still promote Northern dialects.  The 
Northern League has even gone as far as to say that the Italian government is a colonizing force 
which tried to eliminate the usage of dialects in order to try to unite the peninsula.  This paper 
examines how the Northern League has promoted the usage of the dialect Bergamesco in the city 
of Bergamo.  While people may not agree with the more radical stances of the Northern 
League’s political stances such as its anti-migrant stance, people do agree with the party’s stance 
on protecting and promoting the use of dialects.  It has been over one hundred years in Italy, and 
yet the government struggles to standardize the Italian language.  Due to the popularity of the 
Northern League, Bergamesco has been used in more contexts than previously, including in 
regional politics.  Even if parents tend to speak to their children less in dialect, there are still 
regional differences in the standard dialect. 
     Marcel Danesi discusses why Italian dialects are widely spoken and the impact this has on the 
ability of speakers of regional dialects to speak the standard Italian dialect (Danesi, 1974).  In the 
past, speakers of Italian dialects were primarily associated with a lower social class.  Starting 
after World War II, there is more acceptance of speaking dialects.  When a lot of focus is placed 
on learning and speaking dialects, this can make efforts to teach the standard Italian dialect more 
difficult, due to various errors students may make based on the dialects they speak.  A further 
complication is that no national standard exists, and instead there are regional standards for how 
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Italian should be spoken.  These regional dialects can result in difficulty in communication 
between Italians who were educated in different regions.  As a result, Italians as a whole often 
make varying types of grammatical errors when speaking in the standard Italian language.  
Southern Italian dialects often lead to confusion when conjugating verbs into a certain tense in a 
conditional clause.  Northern Italians tend to simplify various intervocalic double consonants.  
An example of this is Northern Italian dialect speakers saying bela instead of bella for beautiful. 
     Farahnaz Faez examines several reforms Italy has made to its education system to incorporate 
foreign language instruction (Faez, 2011).  This has resulted in a large increase in people 
studying foreign languages and English in particular.  Italy has a centralized education system 
creating regulations at the national level, resisting any efforts to decentralize the education 
system to the regional level.  Despite this, schools still have significant autonomy that enables 
them to shift priority away from foreign language education in secondary schools.  Teachers in 
primary school are not always able to adequately teach English due to a proper lack of language 
training.  Proper foreign language education typically begins in secondary school, where teachers 
are specifically trained to deliver instruction in these languages.  Training for secondary school 
foreign language teachers lasts for six years in Italy, which is one of the longest in comparison to 
other member states.   
     Grosu-Rădulescu and Lucia-Mihaela review how in Romania the European Union and 
Bologna Process have both greatly influenced changes in foreign language education at the 
tertiary level.  The Bologna Process is an effort to synchronize higher education in the European 
Union in order to ensure citizens of European countries are being educated in a similar manner 
and allow citizens to work in other countries more easily.  The European Union and Bologna 
Process are dedicated to spreading the values of multilingualism which Romania has started to 
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consider important as well.  Romania’s education system had to undergo reforms to be in 
compliance with the Bologna Process, which aims to improve mobility for students and 
employees.  Reforms influenced by the European Union and the Bologna Process enabled 
Romania to increase foreign language teaching and acquisition.  Under Communism Russian 
prevailed as the major foreign language taught in Romania, and there was a lot of propaganda 
against teaching and learning Western European languages, apart from French.  Knowledge of 
French remained high because French had been used to standardize the Romanian language in 
the 19th century.  Grosu-Rădulescu and Lucia-Mihaela (2018) also describe the difficulties of 
teaching Romanian to foreigners in order to attract migration of teachers and students into 
Romania.  
     Norica-Felicia Bucur and Oana-Rica Popa (2013) write about how after the fall of 
communism in Romania, English became the predominate second language taught in Romania 
and Russian classes are now almost nonexistent in the country.  English became more popular 
due to it being perceived as a more important global language that can help Romanians access 
more job opportunities, particularly after Romania became a member state of the European 
Union.   This has partially helped Romania achieve a high level of English skills.  Classes are 
also available to Romanian students from a younger age due to reforms starting in the 2012/2013 
academic school year.  Adopting a national policy has helped regulate how English is taught in 
Romania.  All foreign languages taught in Romanian schools are regulated by the Romanian 
Education Ministry.  This progress has primarily been motivated by Romania working to abide 
by guidelines set by the European Union.  
         Eleonora Bălănescu (2019) examines how Eastern Europe as a region saw foreign language 
skills decrease after the fall of the Soviet Union, except for Romania.  As Russian was no longer 
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a compulsory language to learn, people stopped using and learning the language in these former 
Eastern European countries.  Many of these countries were slow to replace Russian with other 
foreign languages.  Romania was one of the few countries to not see a decrease.  This is due to 
Russian being quickly replaced with other foreign languages including English and French.  
Gradually Eastern European countries saw students studying one foreign language on average.  
Romania was an outlier as students studied two foreign languages on average.  This would put 
Romania in line with the European Union’s policy of European Union citizens speaking two 
foreign languages in addition to their native language.  The rest of Eastern European countries 
however have appeared to develop their own policy, which is learning English in addition to 




















Chapter 2: Freedom of Movement and General Trends in Intra-EU Migration 
 
     Freedom of movement is one of the four fundamental freedoms of the Single Market, 
alongside the free movement of capital, goods, and services.  As such, these freedoms are 
protected by the aquis communitaire.  At the same time, intra-European Union migration remains 
lower in comparison to migration into the European Union and migration from the European 
Union to the United States (Vasilopoulou and Talving, 2019).  While European Union citizens 
can enjoy many opportunities offered by freedom of movement, there are still restrictions that 
must be discussed.  Member states are able to restrict freedom of movement on the basis of 
public security, public policy, public health grounds and employment in the public sector.  
Member states can prevent entrance or expel a European Union citizen for any of the previously 
mentioned reasons.  For stays under three months, European Union citizens are only required to 
carry a valid document or passport to prove their identity.  For stays longer than this, European 
Union citizens must be able to prove they have sufficient funds and do not become a burden on 
the social services on the member state they are in.  They must also register for a resident permit 
from the member state they are in for any duration over 90 days (Marzocchi, 2020).     
     An example of member states restricting freedom of movement on the basis of public health 
grounds would be during the Covid-19 pandemic.  Since the beginning of the outbreak in 
Europe, member states and the European Union have been discouraging non-essential travel 
within the European Union.  This saw the European Commission publishing guidelines11 on who 
could be restricted from traveling to and from various member states.  If a European Union 
citizen is traveling from a high-risk area, the member state they are traveling to can require them 
 




to take a Covid-19 test and quarantine upon arrival.  The European Union has tried not to restrict 
the movement of workers and has established a protocol for testing based on the risk of various 
types of workers.  For workers who frequently have to cross borders related to work, they are not 
required to quarantine every time they cross a national border within the European Union 
("European Commission.", 2021a).   
     Another important consideration of free movement of people is that it is not limited to 
membership in the EU. Despite being external nations, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and 
Lichtenstein are part of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and are part of the 
Schengen Area agreement. These countries also have agreements to permit Citizens of the 
European Union to move to them, which can impact the number of migrants that member states 
of the European Union receive.  In particular, Switzerland has a large amount of European Union 
citizens living in the country.  In 2019, 1.02 million European Union Citizens were living in 
Switzerland (Fries-Tersch et al., 2021).  Also, all three of these external countries have a higher 
median income than the European Union median.  This enables these countries to attract 
migrants that might have gone to member states in the European Union if the European Union 
did not have agreements to allow migrants to work.  
     There are two possible ways of examining member states and ranking them based on the 
number of intra-European Union migrants they attract.  You can examine intra-EU migration by 
how many European Union migrants there are in a country as a percentage of the total 
population, or you can study intra-EU migration by the overall number of migrants from another 
member state reside in another country.  Depending on the method used, this impacts which 
member states are ranked highest as a destination country for intra-European Union migration.   
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     Recently, Elena Fries-Tersch, Matthew Jones, and Linus Siöland released a study that 
contains data that supports this trend. In 2019, 17.9 million European Union citizens lived in a 
different member state from their birth, and of the 17.9 million, 13 million are of working age 
(Fries-Tersch et al., 2021).  Most European Union migrants continue to have jobs that require 
low education, but an increasing number of European Union migrants have jobs that require 
tertiary education.  The main European Union member states that attract European Union 
migrants with tertiary education are Germany, Spain, France, Belgium, and Austria, meanwhile 
the main member states these migrants came from were Poland, Romania, Italy, Bulgaria, and 
Portugal.  Slightly over a third of these highly educated migrants have a job that does not require 
their education level (Fries-Tersch et al., 2021).   
     Luxemburg has the highest percentage of European Union migrants as a percentage of its 
total population; 44 percent of all people living in Luxembourg are from another member state.  
The countries that follow Luxembourg are Cyprus (17 percent), Malta (12 percent), Ireland (12 
percent, and Austria with 10 percent of its population.  In 2019, the six member states from 
where most EU migrants originated from were Portugal, Poland, Italy, Romania, and Bulgaria; 
these five states have also had the most emigration and have been the five states with the most 
emigration in the European Union for the past several years, accounting for 58 percent.   Almost 
half of all migrants live in Germany or the United Kingdom (Fries-Tersch et al., 2021).   
     Looking at intra-European Union migration on an annual basis, the past several years 
migration has been on a downward trend.  In 2019, the total number of intra-European Union 
migrants increased by only 1.2 percent.  This is largely due to migration to the United Kingdom 
falling significantly.  If United Kingdom is excluded from the data, then the total number intra-
European Union migrants increased by three percent in comparison to the previous year.  This 
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means that the pace of migration growth in 2019 was the same as the previous five years, from 
2014 to 2018.   Portugal, Cyprus, France, Spain, and the Netherlands saw their number of 
migrants increase significantly in 2019 compared to 2018 (Fries-Tersch et al., 2021).   
     While the United Kingdom was a member state, it also had a diverse group of intra-EU 
migrants.  Italy also has a significantly higher percentage of EU migrants who are employed in 
the homes of nationals of the destination country, primarily as nurses.  In particular, 19 percent 
of all EU migrants who work in households work in Italy.  In Germany, the percentage is close to 
only a small fraction of one percent, and also only 7 percent in France and Spain.  As less 
European Union migrants continue to work in households each year, which has the potential to 
hurt Italy’s ability to attract migrants.  In addition, the percentage of European Union migrants 
employed in professional, scientific, and technical activities is significantly lower than that of 
other countries, with only 2 percent employed in this sector in Italy.  In the European Union, the 
median for migrants employed in this sector is 6 percent (Fries-Tersch et al., 2021).  If more 
migrants continue to have a higher level of education, this can also impact Italy’s ability to 
attract migrants in the future, unless there are more jobs which require advanced skills.   
      Italy may be able to change this trend, however, as Italy has numerous professions which 
require a migrant to pass a national exam.  These examines certify that a person is able to 
practice the profession related to their university degree before they can become employed in 
Italy.  This is not the case in other Western European countries, which hurts Italy when it comes 
to its ability to attract migrants as these migrants do not have to deal with this barrier in other 
member states that they can migrate to instead of Italy.   
     Italy is also fourth in the European Union for total number of migrants, but below the 
European Union average based on migrants as a percentage of its total population.  In 2019, there 
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were 1.5 million European Union migrants living in Italy.  When looking at intra-European 
Union migration to Italy as a percentage of the total population of Italy, only three percent of 
Italy’s population were migrants from other member states.  Italy’s rank in terms of total number 
of migrants also equals its rank for total population in the European Union. However, examining 
the migration sources exposes interesting results.  While other countries in the European Union 
have been able to attract migrants from many different member states, Italy relies very heavily 
on Romania as the main source of its migrants.  This is an issue because Romania is also the 
member state with the highest rate of return migration.  This creates a problem for another 
member state whose economic development heavily depends on labor from intra-EU migrants.  
While smaller countries were typically ranked higher than larger countries base on migrants as a 
percentage of the population, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom still had a higher 
percentage than Italy.  Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and France are peer countries for 
Italy, and it is important to examine these countries together.  Not only were these the five 
largest countries in the European Union in 2019, they are also Western European nations, 
ignoring the North/South divide.  When comparing the number of European Union migrants to 
their respective population in this peer group, Italy is doing worse.  
     When looking at intra-EU migration, the European Union classifies new movers as migrants 
who have moved to another member state within the past two years.  Besides relying heavily on 
migrants from Romania, the employment rate of new movers in Italy is concerning as well.  In 
2019, migrants considered new movers by the EU only have an employment rate of 38 percent in 
Italy, in comparison to an employment rate of 66 percent for EU migrants who have lived in Italy 
longer than two years.  New movers are defined by the European Union as migrants who have 
moved to another member state within the past two years.  If Italy cannot address this high 
unemployment rate, it is possible that Italy will lag even further behind when it comes to 
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attracting EU migrants.  EU migrants who emigrated to Italy in the past enjoyed an employment 
rate higher than the national employment average of 58 percent (Fries-Tersch et al., 2021).  This 
can explain why Romanian migration to Italy has slowed, and the majority of Romanians 
migrated to Italy in 2007 or before.  Another factor to take into consideration is that there is not a 
breakdown of those employed in Italy’s informal economy based on nationality.  As time has 
gone on, it is possible a lot more Romanians are employed in Italy’s informal economy without a 
formal contract.      
     In 2018, Italy was 17th among EU and EFTA member states for the number of Intra-EU 
migrants per 1,000 inhabitants.  Italy had just over 25 intra-EU migrants per 1,000 inhabitants 
(see table 2.1).  These statistics are based on migrants regardless if they are from other European 
Union member states or from outside the European Union.  This is possibly due to statistics 
related specifically to European Union migrants in 2018 is unavailable for many member states.  
For the member states that do disclose this data, it is clear that Italy is behind other member 
states that can be considered as part of Western Europe.   
Table 2.1: Intra-EU Migrants in EU/EFTA Member States as of January 1st, 202012 
EU/ EFTA Member 
State 
Intra-EU Migrants  





Luxembourg 396 247,878 626,108 
Cyprus 133.78 118,801 888,005 
Lichtenstein 180.79 7,005 38,747 
Switzerland 166.19 1,430,197 8,606,033 
Iceland 114.32 41,626 364,134 
Malta 102.54 52,761 514,564 
Ireland 93.30 463,166 4,964,440 
Austria 86.34 768,597 8,901,064 
 
12 This table was created with data from Eurostat. < https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser 














Belgium 81.57 939,965 11,522,440 
Norway 69.45 372,796 5,367,580 
United Kingdom 54.93 3,681,859 66,647,112 
Germany 53.56 4,454,418 83,166,711 
Spain 42.67 2,019,487 47,332,614 
Denmark 39.57 230,445 5,822,763 
Netherlands 35.42 616,632 17,407,585 
Sweden 31.21 322,324 10,327,589 
Italy 25.23 1,504,521 59,641,488 
France 23.63 1,599,411 67,320,216 
Czechia 22.91 245,000 10,693,939 
Finland 18.29 101,072 5,525,292 
Portugal 17.94 184,717 10,295,909 
Greece 17.83 191,118 10,718,565 
Estonia 15.71 20,883 1,328,976 
Slovakia 11.05 60,311 5,457,873 
Slovenia 10.27 21,523 2,095,861 
Hungary 8.29 81,060 9,769,526 
Croatia 4.78 19,417 4,058,165 
Latvia 3.45 6,590 1,907,675 
Romania 3.29 63,591 19,328,838 
Lithuania 3.02 8,426 2,794,090 
Bulgaria 2.06 14,342 6,951,440 
Poland 0.96 36,598 37,958,138 
 
     The trend of other western member states attracting more migrants than Italy has continued.  
Spain, Belgium, Austria, France, and the Netherlands all had more migrants from the European 
Union than Italy did in 2018 (see table 2.2).  While France has a higher number of intra-
European Union immigrants is only about 12,000 more than those who moved to Italy, this can 
be explained a larger economy and a larger population in France to absorb more migrants.  
However, these two reasons together cannot explain the higher number of Intra-EU migrants 
arriving in 2019 in the other member states.  Spain has a smaller population, smaller economy, 
and lower GDP per capita than Italy.  Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium all have populations 
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and economies smaller than those of Italy, but each of these member states has a higher GDP per 
capita.    
Table 2.2: Number of Intra-EU Migrants in Specific Western European Nations13 








     While not all member states have information showing whether or not these immigrants are 
from other member states, they do have information on how many immigrants are expatriates 
returning home.  Italy ranks as one of the member states with the lowest percentage of nationals 
returning as part of the total immigration.  Only six member states have nationals as a lower 
percentage of their immigration; Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Luxembourg, Malta, and Spain 
(European Commission, 2021d).  Of these member states that see very few nationals moving 
back as a percentage of the migration, none of them ever saw a large emigration like Italy had.  
This would explain why very few of their nationals are coming back.  Italy on the other hand has 
been one of the largest sources of intra-European Union migration for several years.  While it is 
not clear from what member states they left, it is estimated that 1.3 million Romanians have 
returned to Romania during the pandemic.  This is more than a quarter of the migrants who 
moved abroad in the European Union initially.  The main motivation for some Romanians 
 





moving back was losing their jobs in the informal economy and not having a safety net to fall 
back on to remain within Italy (Mantu, 2020).  
     Even though it is not clear how many Romanians have left Italy specifically, Italy has already 
noticed the consequences.  Italy, along with many other EU member states, has had issues with 
not having enough agricultural labor.  Jobs in this sector do not pay well enough to interest 
nationals of Western or Southern European countries, including Italy and many of these nations 
rely on migrant labor from Eastern Europe to fill positions.  Many Romanians have taken these 
jobs as they pay more than agricultural positions in their home country.  Romania has now raised 
the minimum wage for agriculture workers to 3,000 Romanian Lei a month ($690) to try to 
persuade Romanians to remain (Mutler, 2020).  If raising the minimum wage in the agriculture 
industry and convinces a large number of Romanians to stay, this may impact Italian agriculture 
with a shortage of workers. 
      Before the pandemic, a survey showed 30 percent of Romanians wanted to return to Romania 
in 2018.  Only 21 percent stated that they want to remain in Italy indefinitely.  This is because 
many Romanian migrants living in Italy have maintained close relations with family back in 
Romania which may motivate many to move back to Romania if possible.  31 percent have 
stated that their goal is to construct a home in Romania (Santoro, 2018).  This is surprising as 
these close bonds helped support Romanians in establishing themselves upon arrival in Italy.  
The strong desires of Romanians to return shows the urgency of this situation for Italy.  
     Even though Italy has struggled to attract intra-European Union migrants, Romania’s 
situation is markedly worse.  While Romania has a higher number of migrants than many Eastern 
European Union member states, this does not necessarily mean Romania attracts more migrants 
from other European Union member states.   Many of these migrants are Romanian but had 
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acquired citizenship from their new country.  Like all other Eastern European member states, the 
number of intra-European Union migrants is very low compared to its total population.    
Romania essentially has very few migrants from other European Union member states, and the 
majority of citizens of other member states that move to Romania are Romanians.  Some 
Romanians returning from France and Italy are counted as migrants if they have citizenship from 
one of these member states.  It is important to see why Romania has failed to attract migration 
from European Union citizens who are citizens from other member states, yet the country has 
been seeing an increasing number of Romanians returning to the country, even before the 
pandemic (European Commission, 2021d).   
     It appears that the majority of Romanians currently want to work abroad again, but it is not 
clear if they will return to the member states they worked in before or look to work in other 
member states.  According to a poll sixty-six percent of Romanians who returned to Romania 
during the pandemic want to work abroad once the situation eases up.  While this is the majority, 
one in three Romanians wanting to remain in Romania could have a serious impact on Italy if a 
large amount left Italy.  Romanians not only make up the majority of European Union migrants 
in Italy, but all foreigners in the country.  Romanians are 23 percent of the foreign population 








Chapter 3: Economic Background and Worker Rights in Italy and Romania 
     Italy has the third-largest economy in the Eurozone, and the third-largest economy in the 
European Union after Great Britain left in December of 2020.  Despite its large size, Italy’s 
economy has several issues, as Italy trails other member states on several important economic 
metrics.  Italy is ranked third to last in the European Union when it comes to the unemployment 
rate, only behind Spain and Greece.  Italy also has a significantly lower GDP per capita than the 
richer member states in the European Union, along with a GDP per capita lower than the median 
of all European Union member states.  Part of the negative economic outlook is the severity of 
economic problems in Southern Italian regions.  Along with having some of the lowest GDP per 
capita among Southern or Western European Union member states, several of the regions in 
Southern Italy have some of the lowest employment rates in the European Union.  These regions 
significantly pull-down averages of several metrics in Italy, and much closer to the average 
scores of these metrics for the average of member states in the European Union.  Despite several 
Northern and Central Italian regions being above the European Union average on these metrics, 
it is not enough to make up for the weaknesses of the southern regions.  
     Romania currently has the 12th largest economy in the European Union but is ranked 26th out 
of 27 member states for GDP per capita.  Romania is slowly converging economically with other 
member states and consistently has one of the higher annual economic growth rates of any 
member state.  This growth rate was the highest of any member state during the fourth quarter of 
2020, with a growth rate of 5.3 percent.  Unlike other member states Romania was able to avoid 




     In this chapter I will examine the gross domestic products, employment statistics, wage-
earning rates, and national regulations of both Italy and Romania to further explore the impact of 
economic conditions in relation to migration rates between EU member states. 
Gross Domestic Product  
 
        While the Italian economy may outwardly appear to be troubled, its regional economies tell 
a different story.  The northern and central regions of Italy are significantly better off 
economically than the southern regions of Italy.  This trend remains true across all the major 
economic metrics and includes GDP per capita, unemployment rate, employment rate, and 
median wage.  As previously mentioned by Felice (2019), the northern and central regions of 
Italy rank above the European Union’s median GDP per capita.  Regional inequality can be seen 
in numerous other member states as well that attracted a large amount of intra-European Union 
migration.  
     This is a larger issue for Italy than other member states, due to how of how much lower the 
GDP per capita and employment rates are in the poorer regions of Italy.  This brings down the 
national average GDP per capita and increases the national unemployment rate in Italy.  
Regional inequalities in member states in Western Europe are not as large as the regional 
inequalities observed in Italy, impacting their national averages less.  This is an issue for Italy as 
while several regions are close or above the European Union on several economic metrics, this 
gets hidden as member states are often examined on the national, not regional level. 
      Looking at Romania, it is important to note that the country has the highest economic 
regional disparity among European Union member states that have more than one region in their 
country (City Compass Media, 2020).  The GDP per capita of Bucharest, the region has the 
highest GDP per capita that is 3.6 times higher than Nord-Est Romania which has the lowest 
36 
 
GDP per capita in Romania.  In Nord-Est Romania, employment is still heavily reliant on 
agriculture and has a lower employment rate than all other regions in Romania.  30.6 percent of 
those employed in the Nord-Est region were employed in agriculture, fishing, and forestry.  Only 
58.5 percent are employed in the Nord-Est region, significantly lower than the 69.5 percent 
employment rate in Romania.  Bucharest- Ilov, the richest region in Romania, has an 
employment rate of 90 percent.  In this region only 1.9 percent of those employed work in 
agriculture, fishing, and forestry.  In Bucharest-Ilov 72.9 percent of those employed work in the 
service sector.  In Nord-Est, only 42.8 percent are employed in the service industry (Institutul 




     Numerous Italian regions suffer from high unemployment rates, and the first seven regions 
with the highest unemployment rates are all in Southern Italy (see table 3.1).  Besides Southern 
Italian regions having higher unemployment rates within Italy, several of these regions also rank 
among the worse in the European Union (see table 3.2).  Upon further of examination of the 
regions with the highest unemployment rates in the European Union, it becomes apparent that 
overseas territories are included in the ranking that do not reflect the unemployment rate in their 
respective governing nations.  Removing these overseas territories, Calabria has the fifth-highest 
unemployment rate, and Campania and Sicilia are ranked seventh.  Another concern is the high 
percentage of long-term unemployment rates and youth unemployment rates in these Southern 




Table 3.1: Unemployment Rate in Italian Regions, 15-64 Years Old14 






















Table 3.2: Unemployment in EU Member States15 
Member State Unemployment Rate (2019) 
Greece 17.3 
Spain 14.1 














14 This data can be found at ISTAT. <http://dati.istat.it/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=DCCV_TAXOCCU1> 



















Table 3.3: Regions with Highest Unemployment Rate in European Union (15-74 Years Old)16 
Region  Unemployment Rate (2019) 
Mayotte (FR) 30.1 
Melilla (ES) 27.0 
Ceuta (ES) 25.8 
West Macedonia (EL) 24.6 
Western Greece (EL) 24.1 
Extremadura (ES) 21.6 
Reunion (FR) 21.4 
Andalusia (ES) 21.2 
Calabria (IT) 21.0 
Guadeloupe (FR) 20.6 
Canary Islands (ES) 20.5 
Campania (IT) 20.0 
Sicilia (IT) 20.0 
 
     The European Union defines long-term unemployment as unemployment that lasts longer 
than 12 months.  The European Union has prioritized long-term unemployment as an issue that 
needs to be dealt with since it is a cause of persistent poverty, particularly in regions with a high 
rate of long-term unemployment (Long-term unemployment: Council Recommendation– 
 





frequently asked questions, 2016).  Italy’s long-term unemployment in 2019 was 56 percent and 
is the third highest in the European Union (see table 3.4).  This puts it 15.6 percent higher than 
the long-term unemployment for the European Union. Similar to other metrics, there is a 
significant gap among the regions and areas of Italy.  Overall, Southern Italy’s long-term 
unemployment is significantly higher than northeastern regions. (Cascioli, 2020).  18 regions of 
Italy need to see an improvement to be at the European Union’s long-term unemployment 
average of 40.2 percent.  
Table 3.4: Long-term Unemployment Rate in the EU in 201917 





















Netherlands  30.3 
Czechia 30.0 















     Long-term unemployment is an issue as it serves as a deterrence to migrants from other 
member states.  Since migrants from other member states need to support themselves, having a 
higher long-term unemployment rate than the EU average will encourage these migrants to 
migrate elsewhere.  Migrants can only legally reside in another member state for 90 days before 
showing they can support themselves (Marzocchi, 2020).  This can be difficult to do in Italy if 
over half of unemployed Italians have been unemployed for over twelve months.  Due to the 
time limit and the potential difficulty to find a job in Italy as half of unemployed Italians have 
been unemployed for over twelve months, intra-European Union migrants may decide to migrate 
elsewhere.   
     All across the European Union, youth unemployment which looks at unemployment for those 
between the ages of 15-24 years old was higher than the total unemployment rate.  Similar to the 
total unemployment rate, Italy had a higher youth unemployment rate as well.  An encouraging 
aspect of this was a three percent decrease in unemployment compared to the previous year.  
Exactly like the total unemployment rate, only Spain and Greece had higher rates.  Northeastern 
Italy had the lowest youth unemployment, meanwhile, the Islands had the highest youth 
unemployment rate.  Only the provinces of Trentino-Alto-Adige have a lower youth 
unemployment rate than the European Union average (see table 3.5).  Sicilia and Calabria are 
among the regions with the highest youth unemployment rates in the European Union, not 
including regions that are not overseas territories (see table 3.6), Sicilia and Calabria are ranked 
second and third for youth unemployment in the European Union.  
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Table 3.5: Youth Unemployment Rate in Italian Regions, 15-24 Years Old18 






















Table 3.6: Regions with the Highest Youth Unemployment in the EU19 
EU Region Youth Unemployment Rate 
Melilla (ES) 64.0 
Mayotte (FR) 54.1 
West Macedonia (EL) 53.5 
Ceuta (ES) 52.7 
Guadeloupe (FR) 52.7 
Sicily (IT) 51.1 
Calabria (IT) 48.6 
Martinique (FR) 48.0 
 
      Youth unemployment is a crucial metric as intra-European Union migrants are most likely to 
be younger.  For Bulgaria and Romania, the majority of intra-European Union migrants fall into 
 
18 This data can be found at ISTAT. < http://dati.istat.it/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=DCCV_TAXOCCU1>  




the 20-29 years age range.  For Italy, Spain, Poland, and Germany, most intra-European Union 
migrants fall into the 30-39 age range, but the 20-29 age range is a very close second for all four 
member states (Fries-Tersch et al., 2021).  As Italy has one of the highest youth unemployment 
rates, this can discourage these young intra-European Union migrants from moving to Italy.  
Instead, they will move to member states with a lower youth unemployment rate.  Even though 
Italy has higher wages than the Eastern European member states these young migrants are 
leaving, this does not matter if they are unable to find a job once arriving in Italy.  This is 
particularly true as several of these member states have higher wages than Italy as well. 
     Besides dealing with a high youth unemployment rate, Italy is also dealing with a high 
inactivity rate among young and all Italians.  Inactivity is defined as those who are not in school, 
are unemployed, and not actively looking for employment.  Overall, the rate of inactivity in Italy 
for those between the ages of 15-64 is 34.4 percent, meanwhile, among those aged 15-35 years 
old percent the rate is 36.6 percent (Cascioli, 2020).  This is an important metric to examine as it 
shows the unemployment rate for younger Italians could be significantly higher if these young 
Italians were actively looking for work and included in the youth unemployment rate7.    
     The European Union had a goal to have a 70 percent employment rate in all member states by 
2020, but only 3 out of 109 Italian provinces had achieved this in 2019: Bolzano, Bologna, and 
Belluno.  These provinces are pointed out due to none of Italy’s twenty regions having a 70 
percent employment rate (European Commission, 2021f).  Notably, all of these provinces are in 
Northeastern Italy, which is considered to be the area of Italy with the stronger economy.  While 
the pandemic had an impact on the ability of European Citizens being able to work, no Italian 
region was on track of reaching this target the European Union set before the pandemic started.     
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     A bright spot is that the employment rate is significantly higher for young Italians who have a 
high school or university degree, at 56.5 percent.  This puts it at a similar rate to Italy’s overall 
employment rate, but significantly lower than the 81.5 percent employment rate in the European 
Union for those with a high school or university degree.  Looking at the overall rate for those 25-
64 years old, Italian university graduates have an employment rate of 28.6 percent higher than 
those with a high school diploma.  This is just slightly lower than the European Union’s average 
of a 29 percent difference between those with a university degree, and those with a high school 
diploma (Cascioli, 2020).  While the employment rate for Italians with a degree is significantly 
higher, a problem for this member state is the percentage of Italians who have a degree.  This 
also raises the question of whether the Italian economy would be able to absorb more Italians 
with degrees, or if the unemployment rate would increase.  If the unemployment rate would 
increase, then it would be harder to attract intra-European Union migrants with degrees. 
Romania 
     In contrast to Italy, Romania’s unemployment rate is much lower.  Nationally, Romania’s 
unemployment rate has been steadily decreasing since 2013, but slightly spiked back up in 
December 2020 to 5.2 percent (European Commission, 2021e).  This is still lower than the 
average European Union unemployment.  This increase in unemployment may have been for two 
reasons.  The first may have been due to the Covid-19 pandemic which had the potential to cause 
some people to lose their jobs, the second is the large number of Romanians who lost their jobs 
and then moved back home.  While this looks like a good sign, it is important to keep in mind 
that the population of labor force age in Romania has been decreasing rapidly as well.  In 2013, 
13,997,000 Romanians were of working age meanwhile in 2019 only 12,198,000 were of 
working age.  During this time, the number of employed Romanians slightly decreased.  In 2013, 
44 
 
the employed population in Romania was 8,530,000 and dropped to 8,492,000 in 2019 (Institutul 
Naţional De Statistică, 2020).  More Romanians are not becoming employed, but the labor force 
of the country continues to shrink.  This suggests rather than job creation, Romania’s 
unemployment rate is low possibly because Romanians continue to emigrate to other member 
states to look for work. This would make it difficult to attract migrants from other European 
Union member states as there does not seem to be a higher number of jobs available to help 
entice migrants from other member states.  Another potential factor causing the decrease in size 
of the labor force like Bodogai (2014) points out is the aging population of Romania and 30 
percent of Romanians will no longer be of working age in Romania by 2050.  Having a median 
age of 51.4 by 2050 will have a severe impact on Romania, particularly in rural areas which 
depend heavily on agriculture and where 55 percent of those who are older than 65 already live 
(Bodogai, 2014).  It will be interesting to see if an aging population in Romania continues to be a 
driving factor in the low unemployment rate in Romania.   
     Over reliance on agriculture is an issue for the Romanian economy and employment.  As 
Dachin pointed out, agriculture can experience significant fluctuations in climate and energy 
costs that are hard for small farms to control (Dachin, 2011).  This is particularly relevant to 
Romania, given the small size of Romanian farms.  Dachin interprets the small size of Romanian 
farms an issue particularly when combined with the low output of these farms.  This limits the 
amount of income that Romanian farmers can earn.  Romanian farms are the second smallest in 
Europe, only slightly larger than farms in Malta.  Malta’s farm size is related in part due to the 
country being a small island in the Mediterranean Sea.  On average, farms in Romania are only 2 
hectares in size.  This is one-fifth of the size of the average European Union farm, which are 10 
hectares (European Commission, 2020a).  Other Eastern European countries tend to have smaller 
farms as well, and their size can be seen in the table below.  Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovenia, 
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Croatia, and Poland all have smaller sizes than the average in the European Union.  Romania has 
the largest number of farms in Europe, and accounts for over 34 percent of all farms with 3.4 
million farms.  This large number of farms and large dependence of Romanians on farming for 
employment helps explain the difference in size between farms in Romania and other member 
states.  This may change with less young people working in farming in Romania.  Similar to 
other European Union member states, Romania has a very small percentage of younger people 
acting as farm managers.  
     Given the large percentage of Romanian farms being family owned and very small, it is 
plausible that these farms are labeled as family-owned farms.  In reality this is not a job, but how 
some Romanians survive.  Dachin (2009) explains that many Romanian farmers work in 
subsistence farming, meaning they only produce enough for their family and not enough to sell 
commercially.  This could explain why Romania has the highest percentage of employment in 
agriculture, yet some of the smallest farms in the European Union.  Romanian farms are also less 
efficient in output than other farms, which would make it harder to produce enough for both their 
families to eat and to sell at market for income.      
     Looking at the jobs available in Bucharest, it would be difficult for these to be available in 
more rural areas of Romania.  When looking at European Union countries, the capital city 
typically serves as the primate city20 of the country for both habitation and high-salary jobs.  In 
the Bucharest-Ilov region, there are just over 100,000 jobs in the financial sector (Institutul 
Naţional De Statistică, 2020).  It may not be practical to have these types of jobs in more rural 
 
20 A primate city is the largest city in a country and the most economically important.  Primate cities have double 






regions, but there needs to be a solution.  Part of Romania’s problem is it has no national policy 
in regard to Research, Development, and Innovation, which has a negative impact on more rural 
regions.  Nord-Est in addition has no regional policy in regard to Research, Development, and 
Innovation.  Despite the Nord-Est region having the highest population of all regions with 
Romania, it only attracts a small percentage of foreign direct investment21.  A very low 
percentage of foreign development risks prolonging rural Romania’s economic dependence on 
agriculture, which impacts Romania’s national economy due to 43 percent of Romanians still 
living in rural areas.  The Nord-Est region has several clusters in textiles, medical imaging, 
biotechnologies and agro-food technology, and needs to continue to build off of these (European 
Commission, 2020c). 
     Compared to other member states, Romania’s agriculture sector makes up a significantly 
larger portion of Romania’s economy.  Agriculture also accounts for 57 percent of land use in 
Romania and 23 percent of Romanian employment.  This comes with its own risks, as 
agriculture is dependent on factors often outside the control of the farmers themselves.  There are 
additional concerns that Romanians unable to find jobs are hidden in official unemployment 
statistics due to being labeled as self-employed in the farming sector.  Similar to other member 
states, the overwhelming majority of family-run Romanian farms mainly employee only family 
members.  Out of the 3,422,000 family-owned farms in Romania, 3,395,000 have a labor force 
entirely made up of only family members.  This large number of family-owned shows Romania’s 
continued economic dependence on agriculture and can help prove experts right who believe that 
employment in agriculture is hiding subsistence farming.  This trend is seen in every region of 
 





Europe, and the only member state to have a large number of non-family run yet family-owned 
farms is Spain, where almost 1 out of every 4 European Union farms not family-owned and run 
is located.  13 percent of farms are family-owned in Spain but the majority of employees are not 
part of the family meanwhile, this percentage is well under less than 10 percent in all other 
member states.  Overall, 54 percent of all Romanian farm employees only family workers.  This 
puts it 1.5 percent above the European Union average.  In Eastern Europe farms are less likely to 
have family workers with less than half of the member states, apart from Poland (European 
Commission, 2020a).    
     While overall unemployment was low in 2019, youth unemployment is another story in 
Romania.  In October of 2020, youth unemployment in Romania was very high, at 18 percent for 
anyone under the age of 25.  This puts Romania slightly higher than the European Union youth 
unemployment average, which during the same month was 16.9 percent (European Commission, 
2021e).  Similar to the reasons stated for overall unemployment, the increase in youth 
unenrollment may have been caused by job loss related to the pandemic and a large number of 
Romanians who moved back to Romania during the pandemic.  As Romania’s youth 
unemployment is much closer to the European Union youth unemployment rate than Italy there 




           The median gross hourly wage in Italy was 12.61 euros in Italy in 2018.  This puts Italy’s 
median wage slightly below that of the European Union, including or excluding the United 
Kingdom (see table 3.7).  Italy’s gross salary was lower than all the member states in Western 
Europe apart from Spain and Portugal, but significantly higher than the gross hourly wage of 
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member states in Eastern Europe.  In total, Italy has a higher median gross hourly wage than 16 
of the 27 current member states (European Commission, 2021g).  This helps explain why 
migration is typically from Eastern to Western member states in the European Union, and while 
Italy’s median wage is nowhere near that of Denmark, the highest of any member state, it still 
has a competitive wage compared to how low the wages are in member states in Eastern Europe.  
Table 3.7: Median Gross Hourly Wage in EU Member States22 
Member State Median Gross 











United Kingdom 15.20 
Austria 15.27 
EU 28 13.57 










Croatia  5.37 
Portugal 5.37 
Poland 4.98 
Latvia  4.92 
Lithuania 4.41 
 






Member State Median Gross 






      When discussing wages, it is important to look at geography since geographic proximity 
seems to be a factor in intra-European Union migration.  As intra-European Union migrants tend 
to be to move to member states, this is an issue since many nearby member states to the member 
states who have the largest number of emigrants have higher wages than Italy.  Looking at the 
member states near Italy, France and Austria have higher gross median hourly wages.  French 
and Austrian citizens would not work in Italy unless the specific job pays more.  Italy also 
borders Switzerland and Slovenia.  While Switzerland is not in the European Union, it has higher 
wages than in Italy.  Slovenia’s gross median hourly wage is lower than Italy’s; while this would 
seem like a motive for Slovenians to work in Italy, an issue with this logic is that Austria is just 
to the north of Slovenia and enables Slovenians to make more than in Italy (European 
Commission, 2021g).   
     Besides Slovenia bordering Austria, Czechia, Hungary, and Slovakia all border Austria as 
well and can get a higher wage there than in Italy.  Croatia borders Italy by sea, yet its citizens 
can go to Austria as well.  While some Polish citizens have migrated to Italy, more have 
migrated to Germany.  More migration to Germany can be easily explained as Germany borders 
Poland and has a median gross hourly wage that is almost 3.5 times higher than Poland’s.  Italy’s 
geography also does not encourage European Union citizens to work across the border in Italy as 
the majority of Italy borders the Tyrrhenian, Ionic, and Adriatic seas.  Italy only directly borders 
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Austria, France, Switzerland, and Slovenia, but only Slovenian workers would benefit from 
working in Italy.       
     The member states in the European Union that have a median grossly hourly wage equal to 
less than 75 percent than the median gross hourly wage of the European Union but do not border 
a member state with a median gross hourly wage above 75 percent of the European Union’s 
median are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania (European 
Commission, 2021g).  The problem for Italy is migrants from Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia 
would reach Germany or Austria before reaching Italy and can work there instead.  Their 
languages are significantly different as well, not giving Italy an advantage over Austria, 
Germany, or any other member state with a higher wage.  Cyprus and Bulgaria are also isolated 
from richer member states.  This can help explain why Bulgaria is among the top three member 
states that have citizens living and working in Italy, particularly since there is no language 
benefit for Bulgarians to move to another member state.  The only country where there is a 
language benefit of these member states is Romania, the only significantly poorer member state 
in the European Union that speaks a Romance language.      
     As it is a peninsula, Italy does not have a lot of land borders as other member states do to 
encourage working across the border.  This is a benefit that member states centrally located see 
in particular, and not member states on the periphery of the European Union, like much of Italy.  
Slovakia has the highest share of its work force taking advantage of working across borders.  In 
2015, 6.1 percent of the Slovak work force living in Slovak worked daily across national borders, 
mainly in Austria, the Czech Republic, and Germany.  France and Germany have the largest 
number of workers who commute daily across national borders, with 438,000 and 286,000 
respectively.  (Eurostat, 2018).  Migrants would be traveling through member states with higher 
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wages before arriving in Italy.  Until there is a convergence between Italy and richer member 
states of the European Union, lower wages will serve as a deterrent from migrating to Italy 
despite having higher wages in Italy than the member states that the European Union citizens are 
emigrating from.          
     While Italy has a lower median gross hourly wage than other member states, Italy may still be 
able to attract some migrants as Italy has the fourth-smallest percentage of workers who can be 
classified as low-wage workers23.  According to the European Union, the standard to consider a 
worker as low-wage, these workers earn two-thirds or less of the median gross wage.  Only 
ahead of Italy is Sweden, Portugal, and Finland.  Based on Italy’s gross hourly wage in 2018 of 
12.61 euros, a low-wage earner would be earning 8.32 euros an hour.  This wage is still over or 
almost twice that of the median gross hourly wage in other member states.  Considering there is a 
larger percentage of Eastern Europeans who earn 66 percent or less of their already significantly 
lower national gross median hourly wage, this makes Italy an attractive member state to 
immigrate to (European Commission, 2021g).  Looking at Romania, even if a Romanian earned 
8.32 euros an hour in Italy, this is still 2.22 times the gross median hourly wage of Romania.  
This is also 3.36 times or more the gross median hourly wage of a Romanian low-wage worker, 
as they earn 2.47 euros or less an hour.  As 20 percent of workers in Romania are low wage 
earners, this would make migrating to another member state more attractive (European 
Commission, 2021g).    
     While this statistic seems promising, it is unclear whether this includes workers in Italy who 
work in the informal economy.  A large share of Italy’s low-wage workers may be hidden in the 
informal economy.  As a large number of Romanians work in the Italian informal economy, their 
 
23 Only 8.5 percent of workers in Italy are classified as low-wage earners.  This information can be found at the 
European Commission. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php /Wages _and _l abour_costs> 
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pay can be expected to be lower than Italy’s median gross hourly wage (European Commission, 
2021g).  It does not seem that there are many accurate predictions of what pay is like in the 
informal economy as the majority of the focus is on trying to pinpoint the size of the informal 
economy and how to decrease its size.  For one estimate that does exist, it claims that on average 
regular businesses pay about 16 euros an hour compared to businesses in the informal economy 
which pay 8.1 euros an hour.  This would apply to Romanians and other European Union 
immigrants working in agriculture, in the home of Italians as caretakers, or any other job without 
a formal contract.  However, as pointed out earlier, this lower wage is still significantly higher 
than the wage they can earn in Italy.  As many Romanians immigrating to Italy come from 
poorer eastern regions of Romania, it is plausible that many of these migrants would fall into the 
low-wage worker category of Romanian workers.  Another potential reason for Italy having such 
a low percentage of low-wage workers is due to workers rather being unemployed than taking 
low-paying jobs if they feel they are worth more.   
Romania 
     The issues that regions in Eastern Romania face have triggered the mass migration to other 
European Union member states.   Faced with low wages and a lack of investments has led to 
Romanians wanting to move elsewhere instead.  The cycle of emigration from Eastern Europe is 
difficult to break and has an impact on the infrastructure in various villages.  The young who 
remain and have not emigrated feel it is too risky to have children due to the risk of schools 
potentially closing in the future due to the present lack of children.  This mass exodus has also 
left no one left to do labor within Romania.  Romanians go abroad to work in the vineyards of 
other European Union member states while vineyards in Romania are left unmaintained.  Rural 
Romania has also seen a lack of doctors as mainly have left for higher wages in other countries 
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as well.  This is increasingly making life in rural Romania difficult and may cause these small 
towns and villages to be abandoned forever.  Wages in rural Romania are too low to compete 
with even seasonal jobs abroad (Paun, 2020).  
     Low wages make it difficult to operate businesses in Romania if no one is willing to work for 
a wage that the owner can afford to pay.  Romania has the second-lowest median gross wage per 
hour in the European Union, only ahead of Bulgaria.  This is significantly lower than the 
European Union’s median gross hourly wage (European Commission, 2021g).  While there is the 
possibility to argue about the cost of living and the potential to live better in Romania than other 
member states, the problem is if migrants would want to return home.  Apart from migrants in 
Bulgaria, all other member states have a higher gross median wage per hour putting these 
migrants at a disadvantage if they wanted to move back home.  This logic operates with the 
expectation that migrants will move to a member state where they can earn a higher salary and 
not less money.  which would be the case for any migrants from within the European Union 
besides Bulgarians who move to Romania.        
     As Romanian wages are still too low to compete for migrants with almost all member states 
(apart from Bulgaria), Romania will need to try to take advantage of the 1.3 million Romanians 
that have returned due to the pandemic.  Romania may be able to consider a significant portion to 
stay, as a third of Romanians that have returned already stated want to try to stay in Romania 
permanently once polled.  It is difficult to predict whether these Romanians who have returned 
will be satisfied with the salaries they will find in Romania.  While they have increased since the 
majority of migrants initially left, they still remain lower than the member states these 
Romanians were working in.  It will also be interesting to see if Romanians who moved abroad 
are able to cope living in a rural area again.  While a portion of Romanians worked abroad in 
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rural areas in agriculture, many moved to cities as well across Europe.  It might be difficult to 
readjust to living in rural Romania which cannot offer the same standard of living found in cities 
in other European Countries or even cities within Romania.  Several regions still depend heavily 
on agriculture which is still significantly unpaid in Romania compared to other member states.  
Romania raised the monthly minimum wage in agriculture to 3,000 Romanian Lei ($690) but 
this is still less than in other member states.  Minimum wage is also lower in Romania than the 
wages that Romanian migrant workers can get elsewhere.  A key example would be Romanians 
working in low paying jobs in Germany can earn $1650 a month, compared to $477 a month in 
Romania (Mutler, 2020).  As many Romanian migrants have maintained strong connections with 
their family members, this may be a motive to remain in Romania even if wages are not as high.  
These Romanians had to leave family members and friends behind before, and time will tell if 
these Romanians are able to leave their friends and family a second time after the pandemic 
subsides.    
National Regulation of Migration and Worker Rights in Italy and Romania 
 
     While visa requirements drove migration to Italy before Romania became a member state, 
there is no longer a visa required for European Union citizens who desire to live and work in 
either nation.  If European Union citizens desire to stay for longer than 90 days, they simply need 
to register for a residence permit of that member state and show proof that they can financially 
support themselves without government assistance.  While this is the case, both member states 







     Italy’s large migrant population may be partially caused by Italy having lifted restrictions on 
freedom of movement of Romanian and Bulgarian citizens two years before nine other member 
states did.  These nine member states were Ireland, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Austria, and France.  Even though there may have been 
economic motives such as higher wages in these nine member states and less of a language 
barrier than in Italy that would have encouraged Romanians and Bulgarians to move elsewhere, a 
further two years of restrictions may have encouraged these migrants to choose Italy instead of 
wait another two years (Tolbaru, 2012).   
     In Italy, regulation of migration has remained very weak when it has come to its ability to 
regulate illegal immigration and the informal economy.  This has contributed to the attraction of 
Romanians to serve as badanti to support Italians when they are older.  Many of these 
Romanians are hired with no previous health care experience.  While they are not paid a high 
wage, it is still beneficial for a lot of Romanians to work as badanti if they do not have the 
education to find higher-paid jobs in Romania, Italy, or other European Union member states.  
Due to government support for Italian families who need to hire a caretaker, Romanians have 
been able to find work throughout the peninsula and not just in the richer northern regions.  This 
can also help explain the geographic origin of where many Romanian migrants originally 
emigrate from within Romania.  Most migrants come from eastern regions in Romania, which 
have a lower employment rate in Romania and a higher reliance on agriculture than the median 
region in Romania as well.  Based on a lack of opportunities in these regions in Romania, it 
makes it worth working as a badante in Italy, even in the poorer regions in southern Italy 
(ISTAT, 2020b).   
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     Talani (2019) hints at it, but these Romanian badanti are a part of Italy’s informal economy as 
previously discussed.  The most recent data about how many workers are thought to work in the 
informal economy is from 2016.  Five years ago, it was estimated over 3.7 million people work 
in Italy’s informal economy.  The overwhelming majority of workers work in the service sector, 
accounting for just over 77 percent of the 3.7 workers in the informal economy.  Badanti can be 
classified as part of the service sector of the Italian economy.  The unobserved economy’s value 
that in 2016 was 210 billion euros, equal to 12.4 percent of the official gross domestic product 
that year.  Italy’s informal economy dwarves that of other Western European nations.  The two 
larger economies in the European Union currently, Germany and France, had informal 
economies with estimated sizes of 6.8 percent and 8.9 percent in 2017.  In 2017, Italy’s informal 
economy was 12.9 percent of the official gross domestic product (Tortuga, 2019).   However, as 
Talani pointed out, the estimate from this article only gave the size estimate for the unobserved 
economy, and not the part of the informal economy consisting of illegal activities. 
     Despite an economic incentive for Romanian women to work as badanti in Italy, the poor 
working conditions have caused some Romanian women to migrate back to Romania.  After 
moving back to Romania, a growing number of these women have been diagnosed with Italy 
Syndrome.  Eastern European doctors diagnose women with Italy Syndrome who seem to be 
suffering from mental health issues due to their time working in Italy.  Some of the badanti may 
feel isolated if they emigrated from Romania without families and feel separated from their 
support network.  Some badanti also struggle to integrate into the community where they work 
in Italy.  Some examples of symptoms include insomnia, anxiety, and a feeling of isolation 
(Mihali and Vinci, 2019).  The authors also suppose that even more Romanian women may also 
possibly struggle to cope with their working conditions in Italy. In that case, this may trigger 
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more Romanian women to move back to Romania or potentially search for work in other EU 
member states.    
     There is a clear difference between Northern and Southern Italy and the percentage of the 
total number of workers employed in Italy’s informal economy.  Workers in the informal 
economy in Campania made up 21 percent of those employed in the region in 2016, the most of 
any Italian region.   Both of these regions are converging with their regional groups, Campania 
with the South and Trentino-Alto-Adige with the north.  While this is good as it is a decrease in 
the percentage of workers in Campania that work in the informal economy, it has been gradually 
increasing in Trentino-Alto-Adige, Italy’s richest region.  Campania’s percentage of workers in 
the informal economy as a percentage of the total employed decreased from 26 to 20 percent 
from 2000 to 2016.  During the same time, Trentino-Alto-Adige’s percentage increased from 7 
percent to just over 10 percent matching the average of all Northern Italian regions (Tortuga, 
2019).  In general, it appears that regions with higher unemployment rates have a higher 
percentage of workers that are employed in the informal economy.   
     Sanctions may be necessary in order to decrease the size of Italy’s informal economy.  For 
activities unreported or underreported for the reasons of tax and social security obligations, these 
would be civil sanctions.  For the part of the informal economy consisting of criminal activities, 
those involved would be punished through the criminal system (Lanari, 2018).  While these may 
be effective in fighting factors that cause Italy’s informal economy, these sanctions do not take 
into consideration the 3.7 million workers in Italy in 2016 that depend on the informal economy 
for employment.  As Italy has one of the lowest employment rates in the European Union, it is 
vital to ensure this would not simply worsen the quality of life of Italians and migrants employed 
in the informal economy.  The national government of Italy would benefit from more taxes being 
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paid, but there is no estimate of how these sanctions would impact the number of people 
employed.  It may also cause a lot of European Union migrants to go back home since many 
migrants work in the informal economy.  Italy needs to figure out how to incorporate migrants 
into the formal economy along with Italians that work in the informal economy.  
     It is not surprising a majority of irregular workers are in the service industry, as they can be 
hired to work in the homes of Italians and are harder for the Italian government to catch.  While 
this originally benefits Romanians looking for higher-paying work outside of Romania but are 
not educated, it hurts them in retirement.  While there is some discussion of where Romanians 
are better off retiring in the European Union and Italy is one of those countries, this is irrelevant 
if these Romanians are not regular employees.  Irregular workers have no contracts and do not 
have social security benefits paid for them (Fonte et al., 2018).  This puts Romanian migrants 
and any other employees in a vulnerable spot in what is supposed to be their golden years.  As 
(Bridgen and Traute, 2017) proves in their research, Romanians would be able to retire and have 
a pension just above the poverty line in Italy.  The problem with this is it assumes these 
Romanians working in Italy had an official contract and were working toward a pension in Italy.  
Without an official contract, this is not the case and their pension would be lower than expected.  
The pension would only consist of the benefits that the workers earned from back in Romania 
along with anywhere else they worked before working in the informal economy in Italy. 
      Part of the issue with Italy not regulating migration is related to populist politicians that have 
gained a voice within the country.  In 2018 while Minister of the Interior, Matteo Salvini angered 
Romanians when he made the claim that Romania and Bulgaria exported slaves to Italy.  As 
Romania and Bulgaria rightfully pointed out, the responsibility to regulate labor falls on Italy 
(Luca, 2018).  Although Romanian and Bulgarian government officials did not state this, the 
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treatment of Romanians and Bulgarians as slaves was a problem for Matteo Salvini to handle 
when he was Minister of the Interior.  One of the five departments of the ministry of the Interior 
is Immigration and Civil Liberties.  As Minister of the Interior, Matteo Salvini was responsible 
for all five departments. 
     While Matteo Salvini was responsible for the treatment of Romanian and Bulgarian migrant 
workers, he may have tried to argue he is not because a lot of the slavery accusations in Italy are 
in the agriculture industry.  In this industry, abuse of migrants frequently occurs in Southern Italy 
at the hands of known as corporals, who are the bosses of seasonal agriculture workers (often 
Eastern Europeans).  What is notable about the corporals is they are often of Romanian, 
Bulgarian, or Albanian descent and linked to criminal organizations in their respective nations 
(Luca, 2018).  However, their citizenship does not matter as this poor and illegal treatment of 
workers is happening within Italy and was part of Matteo Salvini’s job to protect the rights of 
these workers in Southern Italy, rather than blame Bulgaria and Romania for exporting slaves to 
Italy.  Statements made publicly like this are not only read by government officials but seen by 
Romanians and Bulgarians themselves.  Even though citizens from both of these member states 
have had a long history of migrating to Italy in the past, this may dissuade them from doing so.  
It is evident citizens of Romania read news articles related to this topic, as the Romanian 
government has already been accused of inaction over reports of slavery in 2017, even before 
Salvini made his comment a year later.  Romanian politicians including Andreea Pastirnac, the 
Minister for Romanians Abroad, went to Southern Italy after these accusations were made 
(Touma, 2017).  While the Minister for Romanians Abroad can advocate for the protection of 
Romanian citizens in other member states, the Italian government is still ultimately responsible, 
in particular the Minister of the Interior to protect the rights of these migrant workers.  This 
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relates to a common misunderstanding of the European Union.  While some sovereignty was 
taken by the European Union, a lot of responsibilities still remain at the national level.      
Romania 
     Romania has not experienced wide-scale migration to the European Union, but it has had to 
introduce new regulations in order to comply with European Union laws and enable Romanian 
citizens to take advantage of freedom of movement.  In 2018, immigrants to Romania regardless 
of citizenship are entitled to the minimum wage of Romania.  Romania’s government also had to 
simplify procedures in order for foreigners to apply for a permit to study or work in Romania.  
The goal of simplifying procedures is to enable Romania to address labor shortages it faces, 
which is important for a member state with over 4 million citizens living in other European 
Union member states.  While it has not yet attracted a large amount of European Union migrants, 
Romania’s foreign-born population has increased by 278 percent since 2009 (OECD, 2020).   
     Similar to Italy, Romania suffers from a large informal economy.  In 2016, Romania’s 
informal economy was estimated to be equivalent to 24.4 percent of Romania’s official GDP, or 
38 billion euros.  Compared to Italy, only 0.3 percent is estimated to be from illegal activity.  
22.1 percent comes from unregistered companies, unrecorded employees, and underreported 
production (City Compass Media, 2017).  The size of Romania’s informal economy is a dire 
issue as Romania can use tax revenue in order to improve infrastructure and invest in regional 
growth in order to converge with the other member states in the European Union.  Romania’s tax 
base already shrunk with 4 million Romanians living in other member states.  These citizens do 
not pay taxes in Romania, only in the member state where they work.       
     While Romanian government officials may have been angered by Matteo Salvini’s comments 
about Romanian slaves in Italy, the Romanian government also needs to improve conditions 
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within the country.  Romania was ranked as the worst EU member state in the Modern Slave 
Index of 2017 (Verisk Maplecroft, 2017).  It is the only member state in the European Union to 
be considered high risk for modern slavery.  Romania is ranked as the worst member state due to 
the lack of enforcement of laws meant to protect the rights of workers (Touma and Chereseva, 
2018).  Besides having the second-lowest wages in the European Union, it is difficult to attract 
intra-European Union migrants to Romania if the rights of workers are not protected.  Even if the 
Romanian government sets a minimum wage for a certain industry such as Multer (2020) points 
out one was set for agriculture, the ability of Romania’s government to enforce this minimum 
wage is called into question by the Modern Slavery Index.  This can also impact the decisions of 
Romanians on whether or not they will remain in Romania or move back abroad when the 
pandemic ends.  As Romanian migrants who moved back during the Covid-19 pandemic which 


















Chapter 4: Language Capabilities in Italy and Romania 
     Widespread knowledge of additional languages is an important factor in movement of citizens 
around the European Union.  Skills in less-commonly-spoken languages, or lack thereof, can be 
either a boon or a barrier for EU migrants looking to move from one EU member state to 
another. As neither Italian nor Romanian are widely spoken in the European Union outside Italy 
or Romania, it is important that these two respective countries fill the gaps with either migrants 
from nations that have closely-related language groups, or with migrants who use more widely 
spoken languages in the EU. 
 Italy 
     In 2018, only 3.4 percent of European Union students in general upper secondary education 
were studying Italian.  The three member states with the highest percentage of students in 
general upper secondary education studying Italian were Malta, Croatia, and Austria.  All three 
countries are geographically near Italy and are some of the smaller member states in the 
European Union.  In Austria, citizens on average earn higher wages24 than Italians and the 
country also has a lower unemployment rate than Italy25.  Austria also has a lower 
unemployment rate than Italy.  Over a quarter of Austrians that have migrated to Italy reside in 
the region of Trentino-Alto-Adige (ISTAT, 2020b).  In this particular Italian region, a majority 
of residents speak German, the native language of Austria.  Trentino-Alto-Adige used to be part 
of Austria, and a majority still speak German as their primary language.   
 
24 Data regarding wages can be found at Eurostat 
<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/earn_ses_pub2s/default/table?lang=en> 
25 In 2019 percent only 4.5 of Austrians were unemployed compared to 10 percent of Italians.  This data can be 




     The English Proficiency Index tests the English proficiency of countries around the world.  
When Looking at the English Proficiency Index, it is obvious that Italy is significantly behind the 
other member states in the European Union.  Italy is ranked second to last among all member 
states, and only ranks ahead of Spain.  Italians are categorized as moderately proficient in 
English.  This score puts the average Italian who took the exam at a B2 level.  This means 
Italians can comprehend television shows, make presentations at their work, and read a 
newspaper.  This score also means that Italy is behind all other Southern European Union 
member states, except for Spain.  While Italy currently is ranked as the second worse member 
state, Italy was the member state that saw the most improvement from the previous year.  Italy 
increased its overall position in the world from 36 in 2019, to 30 in 2020.  This brought Italy 
ahead of Spain, as Italy only improved from 35th to 34th worldwide.  The English Proficiency 
Index points out that for Italy and Spain, the lower scores are of particular concern for these two 
countries due to their high unemployment rates.  This index feels English skills are vital in order 
to create economic opportunities.  From 2011, Italy has improved, as it was rated at low 
proficiency in the first edition of the English Proficiency Index (EF English First, 2020).  
Unfortunately, the index changed its scoring system for countries between the 2019 and 2020 
editions, so it is not possible to see how Italy’s score changed from the first year to the tenth 
year.            
Upon examination of the number of citizens who reported skills in more than one language, 
Italians ranked 20th out of 28th when compared to other member states in 2020.  66 percent of 
Italians aged 25-64 years old stated that they could speak one or more languages (see table 4.1).  
It is important to know that in Italy there is a significant difference between the various age 
groups and their foreign language knowledge.  More younger Italians reported that they knew 
one or more languages compared to older Italians.  Despite significantly more younger Italians 
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reporting that they speak one or more languages, they still are in 20th place when looking at only 
those aged 25-34, as citizens aged 25-34 in other member states reported that they could speak 
one more foreign languages at a higher percentage than older people in these member states 
(European Commission, 2021c).  It is difficult to say how reliable this is since this is self-
reported.  A potential problem is that respondents in one member state are more optimistic than 
those in another member state.  This is why it is important to have data from standardized exams 
such as the English Proficiency Index, as long as the exam is taken by students throughout the 
country and not only students considered to have a higher level of English take the exam.   
Table 4.1: Knowledge of One or More Foreign Languages by Age Group26 
 
 
26 This data can be found at Eurostat. 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/edat_aes_l22/default/table?lang=en. 
 Percent of Age Group  
Member state 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 
Finland 98.3 96.4 92.0 92.2 
Latvia 97.7 95.2 96.3 93.9 
Denmark 97.4 96.8 95.3 94.1 
Sweden 96.6 96.9 96.8 95.1 
Estonia 96.4 92.1 91.2 85.4 
Austria 96.0 91.0 84.6 73.1 
Malta 94.8 92.8 91.1 87.7 
Luxembourg 94.6 94.6 94.7 93.8 
Lithuania 94.2 96.9 96.5 94.5 
Cyprus 93.3 94.4 91.2 77.6 
Slovakia 91.7 88.8 85.9 86.0 
Slovenia 91.6 87.9 80.2 77.3 
Netherlands 90.1 89.6 86.3 79.9 
Czechia 89.7 82.2 75.5 66.3 
Croatia 89.6 80.8 70.2 56.6 
Greece 86.6 81.6 61.0 40.5 
Belgium 85.7 80.8 76.4 71.5 
Germany 84.9 82.3 88.4 70.1 
Portugal 84.7 77.5 65.9 49.8 






        It is also important to look at the level that respondents are claiming to speak the foreign 
language at.  While 66 percent of Italians reported they can speak one or more foreign languages, 
a much higher percentage report it at a basic level rather than an advanced level (see table 4.2).  
In comparison to other member states, Italy has the least amount of people reporting speaking 
their first foreign language at a proficient level and the most respondents that report speaking 
their first language at a basic level (European Commission, 2021c).      
Table 4.2: Level of Foreign Language Proficiency in EU Member States27 
 Level of Foreign Language Proficiency (2016) 
Member State Proficient Good Basic 
Luxembourg 65.5 21.7 11.9 
Sweden 59.7 26.4 13.6 
Malta 50.9 27.8 21.3 
Slovenia 48.5 38.1 13.4 
Lithuania 45.2 29.2 25.6 
Denmark 41.1 34.5 24.1 
Latvia 41.0 32.2 24.6 
Netherlands 36.7 42.1 20.9 
Austria 35.8 31.4 32.8 
Cyprus 34.5 38.1 27.4 
Estonia 34.4 25.1 40.4 
Finland 34.2 40.4 25.2 
Slovakia 33.1 37.2 29.7 
 
27 This data can be found at Eurostat. 
<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/edat_aes_l31/default/table?lang=en> 
 Percent of Age Group 
Member State 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 
Poland 81.8 70.3 59.2 54.6 
France 66.1 65.4 57.7 51.5 
Spain 66.0 60.7 50.9 38.9 
Hungary 59.6 49.8 34.9 25.4 
Bulgaria 58.3 51.9 47.6 60.2 
Ireland 58.3 43.8 46.4 42.9 
Romania 55.7 40.9 38.8 17.1 




 Level of Foreign Language Proficiency (2016) 
Member State Proficient Good  Basic 
Ireland 31.9 22.2 45.6 
Greece 30.5 35.6 33.6 
Spain 29.8 30.8 38.4 
Belgium 28.7 38.7 31.9 
Germany 27.5 32.7 39.4 
Croatia 26.9 35.3 37.8 
Hungary 25.4 26.4 46.2 
Bulgaria 25.0 35.8 39.0 
United Kingdom 22.0 24.9 52.8 
Portugal 21.3 29.2 49.5 
France 19.9 29.0 51.1 
Poland 14.8 26.1 59.0 
Romania 14.7 31.1 54.2 
Czechia 11.8 25.4 62.8 
Italy 10.8 25.5 63.7 
 
     Only a handful of member states had more than 50 percent of respondents speaking foreign 
languages at a basic level.  Of the larger member states, the United Kingdom and France both 
have percentages over 50 percent of those speaking their first foreign language at a basic level, 
followed by Germany and Spain at around 40 percent reporting their knowledge of their first 
foreign language at a basic level (European Commission, 2021c).  One problem for Italy is that 
English and French are widely studied throughout the European Union, which hinders other 
member states in attracting intra-European Union migrants.  As previously discussed in Chapter 
3, economic conditions already make Italy a less attractive destination for migrants, so therefore 
at the very least Italy should prioritize second-language training that enables Italians to work and 
communicate with European Union citizens from other member states.    
     Italians may be slowly improving their English skills, as the Italian government has lowered 
the age that Italians start learning English as a foreign language.  In 1984, the Italian government 
set the age at 11 to start learning English in school; in 2007, the age was lowered to six.  English 
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in Italy has become an obligatory foreign language for students to study, but simply classifying 
English in this manner does not mean Italian students are becoming fluent in the language.  A big 
issue for Italian students is the way English has been taught.  English courses are not interactive 
enough for students such as practicing real-life situations and practicing dialogue that they can 
use in situations (Faez, 2011).  The amount of time students spend in English courses is also 
considered insufficient. However, this is questionable.  Italians spend more time in English 
courses than several other European countries, yet still have a poorer grasp of the language. 
      As Faez (2011) points out, secondary schools do not have to prioritize foreign languages due 
to the autonomy Italian secondary schools enjoy despite being regulated at the national level.  
This hurts Italian students as the lack of prioritization of foreign language classes does not take 
advantage of the six years foreign language teachers spend training to teach foreign language 
classes.  It would be more beneficial for Italian schools to focus more on foreign language 
courses in secondary school in comparison to primary school when teachers are not trained as in-
depth how to teach foreign languages.  The issue for Italy is it seems to be that Italy needs to 
focus on quality over quantity.  Despite lengthening the period of time Italian students study 
foreign languages, their language skills still lag behind the majority of other member states in the 
European Union.  Italy is also lagging behind the goal in the European Union to study two 
languages.  In 2018, only a little over a third of students studying two or more foreign languages 
in upper secondary school in Italy in 2018 (see Table 4.3).  This put Italy behind 16 other 





Table 4.3: Students in Upper Secondary School Studying Two or More Foreign Languages28   
Member State Percentage of Students Studying Two or 





























     It is also not a question of whether Italian students are getting enough hours of foreign 
language education.  A total of 891 hours is dedicated to foreign language classes in primary and 
lower secondary school in Italy, which is one of the highest for any of the member states (Faez, 
2011).  Looking at the more updated statistics, Italy has a higher percentage of students studying 
English than most other member states with 99 percent of Italian pupils studying English.  Less 
 




than five percent study German or French, which is in line with most member states29 (European 
Commission, 2021c).  However, this is perhaps due in part to the prevalence of heritage French 
and German speakers in Valle D’Aosta and Trentino-Alto-Adige, respectively; French and 
German are official minority languages in these regions.  This puts Italian students at a 
disadvantage as well if either of these languages takes on a larger role in the European Union 
since the United Kingdom left in late 2020.  While there seem to be clear issues about how 
English is taught in Italy, Italy needs to work on making other foreign languages more available 
besides also worrying about the quality in them as well.       
     Motivation is an important aspect in order to learn a language, but Italian students do not 
appear to be lacking in this aspect either.  When polled, educators believed that over two-thirds 
of students in secondary schools in Italy were motivated to learn English.  A British professor of 
English that Faez (2011) interviewed claimed that this is because Italians only want to learn 
English for superficial reasons such as understanding English in popular culture including music 
and movies and with the intention to travel rather than truly learn the language.  He also stated 
that Italians can be successful enough to not have to learn English and that the Italian culture is 
strong and acts as a barrier.   
     While politicians continue to fight about the role of Italian dialects in politics, the larger role 
of English In Italian universities is angering some Italians.  In 2012, the Politecnico di Milano 
announced that all graduate courses would be taught and assessments completed in English, 
while no courses would be taught in Italian.  The main argument for making the change was that 
completing coursework in English will make students more employable more employable, 
 
29 Only seven member states have more than ten percent of primary school students studying French or German, 




because English has become a common language in higher education.  While this was a decision 
that shocked people, he predicted in five to ten years that more Italian universities would follow 
the example set by the Politecnico di Milano.  He points out that Italian can be a barrier in 
attracting students from other countries.  On the other hand, additional scholars have pointed out 
that instruction in other languages than Italian have the potential to weaken the Italian culture if 
more textbooks are written in English and not in local languages.  While switching to English is 
beneficial to attract more international students, it works against Italians who do not speak 
English at all, or at a level that is advanced enough tertiary education (Coughlin, 2012).   
     While attracting international talent, Italy needs to make sure it is not excluding Italians from 
higher education.  This is a possibility since Italians have one of the lowest levels of English 
proficiency in the European Union, but also have the second-lowest rate of college graduation.      
If Italian students are unable to study in Italian in higher education in Italy, then they may forgo 
attending university.  This would do nothing to improve Italy’s college graduation rate, which as 
mentioned earlier, is already the second lowest in the European Union.   
    Four years later in 2018, there were efforts to stop universities from developing solely 
coursework in English.  A Council of State ruled that English-only degree programs marginalize 
Italian in academia and restrict access to courses from Italian students and professors who do not 
speak English.  The constitutional court also ruled against universities having English-only 
degree programs.   The Vice-Chancellor of the Politecnico of Milano disagrees with this and 
feels it is an economic burden to require Italian universities to have courses available in both 
languages.  The problem is, many Italian universities already have courses available in both 
languages, which goes against the stance of the Politecnico of Milano.  This ruling comes 
following an effort by professors to appeal the decision to switch to only English in post-
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graduate courses at the university.  The professors made it clear they have no issues with 
teaching courses in English, or with the English language itself; they simply do not want to see 
the Italian language vanish from higher education.  
     The Constitutional Court also pointed out in the ruling that instead of learning various 
languages when studying abroad through the Erasmus program, many European Union students 
simply learn English regardless of what country they go to (Civinini, 2018).  Many students want 
to study in English programs, but the cost of studying in the UK is very high; many European 
students instead choose nations such as Poland because there are English courses, but the cost is 
much lower.  Many of the courses offered to Erasmus students are also offered in English 
making it harder to learn the host language (Matthews, 2019).   Professors and the Vice-
Chancellor from the Politecnico di Milano seem to be angered by the ruling and have taken the 
ruling out of context out of context.  The ruling does not ban English completely from Italian 
universities, but instead attempts to strike a balance between languages so as not to exclude 
Italians who do not have an advanced level of English yet from studying in courses.   
     As most member states have a higher graduation rate (Italy ranks 26th out of 27), this is a 
strong possibility for Italy (European Commission, 2020b).  Just as university leadership is 
considered about the ability of foreign students to study in Italy, they need to ensure English is 
not a barrier to Italian students and ensure Italian students are learning enough English in order 
to enter English-only programs.  Italy might be able to expand the number of programs offered in 
English when the level of English for Italian students improves.  This will also depend on how 
major of a role English continues to play in the European Union.  As the United Kingdom has 
left, the population in the European Union that speaks English as its native language has dropped 
significantly.  English will no doubt remain an international language, but Italian universities 
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might also offer courses with a language of instruction as French or German if they have more of 
a role within the European Union in the future.     
Romania  
     Romanians have one of the highest percentages of students studying two or more foreign 
languages.  In 2018, 99 percent of Romanian students study two or more foreign languages in 
school; this means that Romania is on track to meet the goal of the European Union to have all 
citizens speak two additional languages besides their native language.  The goal to speak two 
additional languages was set by the Education, Youth, Culture, and Sport Council.  The rationale  
behind setting this goal was to improve the mobility, employability, and strengthen the 
intercultural exchange among member states (Education, Youth, Culture, and Sport Council, 
2014) 
     Upon examining Romania’s efforts to teach foreign languages, it is evident it is behind in 
comparison to other European Union member states when it comes to the results of these efforts.  
Romania looks successful when compared to other European Union member states based on the 
number of foreign languages that students learn, but this does not mean that these students 
successfully learn the language.  When looking at the statistics published by the European Union, 
Romania ranks as one of the member states with the lowest percentage of citizens fluent in 
foreign languages.  In 2016, only 13.7 percent of Romanians aged 25-64 spoke their first foreign 
language proficiently (European Commission, 2021c).  This puts Romania as the third member 
state with the smallest percentage of citizens speaking their first foreign language proficiently.  
At the same time, Romania has the fourth highest percentage of citizens who speak their foreign 
language at a basic level.  As the amount of European Union citizens that speak Romanian is 
below one percent of the population, it is crucial that Romanians learn one of the top foreign 
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languages in the European Union to make up for this.  Throughout the European Union and 
particularly in Eastern Europe, English is already the most studied foreign language (European 
Commission, 2021c).  While it is important that Romanians have the opportunity to study foreign 
languages in school, if the quality of the classes are not high enough for Romanian students able 
to speak the foreign languages they study after completing the classes.  The quality of foreign 
language instruction is questionable due to the poor performance of Romania compared to other 
member states in the statistics published by the European Union.      
     The EF English Proficiency Index is more optimistic.  Since first ranked by the index in 2014, 
Romania has always been ranked in the high proficiency category.  In this year, Romania was 
ranked 12th in the European Union and 13th in 2020 which puts Romania in the top half of 
member states both years.  Ranking in the high proficiency category means the average 
Romanian tested at a B2 level on the CEFR exam.  While Romania’s position may have moved 
up or down a position over the various years, Romania has always been ranked in the high 
proficiency category.  Romania’s score decreased a little from the previous year, but it is 
impossible to quantify it, as the index changed how it reports results between the 2019 and 2020 
editions.  Based on the Index, Romanians are ranked highly proficient and can comprehend 
television shows, make presentations at their work, and read a newspaper.  The Romania is 
ranked 4th in Eastern Europe, after Croatia, Hungary, and Poland (EF Education First, 2020).  
Romania ranks 13th out of the 26 European Union member states that were ranked.  The United 
Kingdom and Ireland are not ranked, most likely as English is the national language in each of 
these countries.      
     The English Proficiency Index focuses mainly on younger people and their language skills in 
English.  When looking at a wider range of Romanians again, Romania is ranked as one of the 
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last member states for how the number of citizens that knew one or more foreign languages.  
Considering that Romania ranks in the top half for European Union member states in the English 
Proficiency Index, it may be a case that a lot of younger people know a foreign language, but the 
number of older people who do not is dragging down Romania compared to other member states 
(EF Education First, 2020).  A potential issue that may skew the results of the EF English 
Proficiency Index for Romania’s ranking is the number of students who take it.  The number of 
students who take the exam for each country is not listed.  However, some member states may 
have more reliable statistics than others.  In the case of Romania, the EF English Proficiency 
Index stated that 70 percent of Romanians had internet access, but the exam the Index uses is 
only online (EF Education First, 2020).  This leads to a potentially large group of students who 
cannot take the exam, but also lack the ability to expose themselves to opportunities to learn and 
practice English online. 
     When looking at statistics for Romania, this is true.  Younger Romanians tend to have 
significantly higher foreign language knowledge and higher mobility than older Romanians.  
Romania is one of the member states that sees a higher difference when comparing various age 
groups.  Despite a significantly larger percentage speaking one or more language, Romanians 
aged 25-34 are still second to last ranking only better than the United Kingdom (European 
Commission, 2021c).  Besides a generational gap, it might also be that in other member states 
that do not rank as high as Romanians on the English Proficiency Index, they may be doing 






Chapter 5: Conclusion 
     The Freedom of Movement of people is a massive achievement for the European Union, but it 
is crucial to understand why migration remains uneven among member states.  Member states in 
Northern and Western Europe have benefited from migrants coming from Southern and Eastern 
European nations in the European Union.  It is important to understand what has caused this 
migration, which remains largely uni-directional, and why Eastern and some Southern European 
Union nations have not been able to attract intra-EU migrants.  In particular, Romania and Italy 
are two of the larger member states yet do not have the same success as other countries in the 
European Union.          
     To answer my research concerning the impact of language skills as opposed to economic 
deterrents on intra-European Union migration to and from Southern and Eastern European 
member states, this thesis ultimately argues that it is a combination of both when applied to 
Romania and Italy.  Some economic deterrents are stronger in Romania, such as lower wages. 
Meanwhile, the total, youth, and long-term unemployment rates are more significant issues in 
Italy.  Romanians have a higher proficiency in English than Italians. Yet, both member states 
need to continue to improve their foreign language skills since Romanian and Italian are not 
commonly studied languages in the European Union.  Ultimately, the economic aspects are more 
important than language proficiency.  Earning higher wages seems to be the most critical factor 
to attract intra-European Union migrants.  Foreign language proficiency can contribute to a 
country’s ability to attract migrants from other member states, but not without high wages.  If a 
member state has higher foreign language proficiency but lower wages, this may increase the 
number of citizens from that country emigrating to other nations with higher wages. 
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     Italy has higher wages than many other EU countries, but still below the European Union 
average and has lower wages than some of the other large member states.  While wages in Italy 
are not the lowest, other economic metrics are significantly worse in Italy than almost all other 
member states.  The high total, youth, and long-term unemployment may deter intra-EU 
migration to Italy as migrants need to support themselves if they stay in another member state for 
longer than 90 days.  Instead, intra-EU migrants can migrate elsewhere, particularly when most 
nations in the European Union have significantly lower unemployment rates.  To attract more 
intra-EU migrants, wages in Italy would need to converge with higher-paying member states and 
a significant decrease in the unemployment rates.   
     In addition, the Italian government needs to improve the foreign language skills of Italian 
citizens significantly.  While many Italians are studying English, the level of English Italians 
speak is still considerably lower than in other member states.  Rather than just the quantity of 
classes, the Italian government must focus on the quality of foreign language courses.  As Italian 
is not a commonly studied language in the European Union, Italy’s government must work to 
strengthen the language skills of Italians in the languages that are the most studied in the 
bloc.  Italy cannot expect that many European Union citizens will start learning Italian to work in 
Italy due to the economic deterrents, especially as French, German, and English represent the 
national languages of the highest-performing European economies. 
     That being said, Italy has experienced immigration from other EU member states, but the vast 
majority of the migrants have come from Romania, making up three-quarters of all intra-EU 
migrants living in the nation.  The predominance of one group of intra-EU migrants in Italy is an 
exceptional phenomenon, which is not the case of other member states.  Other member states 
that have attracted the most migrants in the EU have a large population from several member 
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states and do not have a majority from only one country.  This risk would be more significant for 
Italy than other member states, especially if anything motivated most Romanian migrants to 
leave.  An exodus of Romanian migrants from Italy may leave labor gaps in the Italian 
economy.  There is a valid concern that this may happen due to Romanian women who have 
already left the country and have been diagnosed with Italy Syndrome, partially due to poor work 
conditions they faced while working as badanti in Italy.  
     In Romania, a low total unemployment and youth unemployment rate is not enough to attract 
intra-EU migrants when wages are lower than all other member states besides Bulgaria.  Besides 
Bulgarians, citizens of any nation in the European Union would see their salary decrease if they 
worked in Romania.  The efforts of the Romanian government to increase English fluency are 
not enough on their own without a more robust economy.  Romania must see more economic 
convergence, particularly convergence in wages with the other European Union member states, 
to attract intra-EU migrants. 
     Romania’s education system has improved and has made numerous changes to educate 
students in foreign languages, which will ultimately benefit the mobility of young Romanians 
within the European Union as a whole.  While younger Romanians have made a lot of progress 
in speaking English, this is not enough to attract migrants from other nations in the European 
Union if citizens in all but one member state can make more money in their home country than 
Romania.  For Romania to benefit from the improvements the population has made in speaking 
English, it will have to see significantly more economic convergence with other European Union 
nations.  
     Both member states must also continue to work towards protecting the rights of workers 
within Italy and Romania.  It is unlikely that intra-EU migrants would choose to move to either 
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member state, which both rank as some of the worse in the bloc for the risk of modern slavery, 
according to the Modern Slavery Index.  Economics and linguistic skills are essential, but these 
two aspects do not outweigh the importance of respecting intra-EU workers along with their 
citizens.  
     One avenue for future research is the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on Romanian 
migration.  Because the pandemic has not yet ended, the effect of the pandemic is still 
challenging to study, and it may be years before this can be effectively measured.  It is clear that 
many expatriate Romanians returned to Romania during the pandemic, it is neither clear what 
member states the Romanians left, nor the number that left each country.  As many Romanian 
women work as badanti in Italy, and many Romanians work in the informal economy; it would 
be surprising if the pandemic did not impact the number of Romanians working in Italy.   While 
Romanians can earn higher wages in Italy than in Romania, Italian economic factors may push 
migrants to other member states.  Italy has both a higher unemployment and youth 
unemployment than most other member states in the European Union, along with lower wages 
than the majority of countries in Western Europe.  When examining Romanian migration in the 
European Union, economic factors alone cannot explain why Italy has the most Romanian 
migrants of European Union member states.  Instead, these economic factors help explain why 
most other nations part of the bloc in Western Europe have more intra-EU migrants than Italy per 
1,000 residents.  
     Since a significant portion of intra-EU migrants in Romania are Romanians who gained 
citizenship in other member states, it would be helpful to evaluate what is causing Romanians to 
move back since wages still remain lower than in most other member states.  Based on what 
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caused these Romanians to move back, the Romanian government could attempt to attract other 
Romanian workers to move back. 
     Another factor that would be interesting to examine is Brexit’s effect on Romanians and other 
intra-EU migrants currently living in the United Kingdom.  Intra-EU migration to the United 
Kingdom will be an important issue to study as the nation has the second-largest number of intra-
EU migrants only after Germany.  It will be interesting to see whether these migrants will 
attempt to continue living in the United Kingdom, move back to their home country, or move to 
other member states with higher wages than their home country.  There is a lot of confusion 
about what Brexit means for the ability of European Union citizens to continue living in the 
United Kingdom.    
     The structures of foreign language courses in each member state are also important to 
examine.  A comparison of foreign language courses may explain why EU citizens in some 
member states are more proficient in foreign languages than other nations.   The member states 
with a higher proficiency in foreign languages may utilize different teaching methods that have 
proven to be effective.  Some member states may give students more time to practice their 
language skills in class in a full immersion environment.    It is not enough for member states to 
simply offer foreign language courses; the quality of the courses is vital for students to gain 
proficiency in the foreign languages they chose to study.    
     As Italy’s economy has grown slower than other member states, this may impact Italy’s 
ability to continue to attract intra-EU migrants following the COVID-19 pandemic.  Besides 
having lower wages than many other member states in Western Europe, it is uncertain how long 
it will take for the Italian economy to recover from the pandemic.  The economic deterrents may 
convince current Intra-EU migrants working in Italy to work elsewhere.  Delayed economic 
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recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic may also potentially deter intra-EU migrants from moving 
to Italy in the future due to the economic deterrents and lack of foreign language skills when 
compared to other member states.  
     As previously stated, intra-EU migration will continue to remain uneven among EU member 
states until there is convergence in both the national economies and language skills of the nations 
and regions of Europe.  Some member states are more competitive due to higher wages and a 
higher knowledge of English among their population.  Economic factors act as a pull factor for 
intra-EU migrants, but common language skills allow a migrant to find a job.  Simultaneously, 
without a strong economy, strong language skills enable citizens of a member state to migrate 
themselves rather than attract migrants from other member states.  Member states must have 
strong economies that can offer competitive wages and a multilingual workforce to attract intra-
EU migrants.  As the most commonly spoken language is English, it appears this is the most 
important foreign language in the European Union, particularly for member states who do not 
have a widely studied national language such as French or German.  
     A difficulty with economic convergence in the European Union is the inability of the bloc to 
pass a minimum wage.  Several European Union nations do not have a minimum wage, and 
instead, labor unions negotiate the salaries of employees.  The European Union has left the 
competency of setting a national standard for wages to the member states.  The EU might face 
challenges if it were to set a standard since member states can perceive the bloc as encroaching 
on a policy area left initially to the nations.  Member states may feel threatened and accuse the 
European Union of stealing sovereignty from the national level.  The lack of a minimum wage in 




     As the European Union and the Single Market continue to more deeply integrate and expand 
its four freedoms of movement—people, goods, services, and capital—unequal patterns of 
migration are likely to continue unless leadership is taken at the member state level.  Evidenced 
by the Eastern European expansion in 2004, 2007 and 2012, newer member states generally have 
lower wages and language skills.  Due to lower wages and lower proficiency of foreign 
languages, it is harder for new member states to attract intra-European Union migrants.  Both 
aspects lead to uni-directional migration from these member states to wealthier nations in the 
bloc.  This pattern shows why new member states must focus on foreign language proficiency 
among their citizens, and the EU must further emphasize and encourage economic convergence 
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